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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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VAN MIERT, NOTHOMB DEBATE STATIONING OF EUROMISSILES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 20 Sep 80 pp 1,3

[Article by F.U.: "'Game to the Finish', Van Miert and Nothomb on Euromissiles"]

[Text] Having taken care of the steel problem for the moment, the government met in weekly council this Friday and took up again another ticklish subject: Euromissiles. Mr Nothomb was responsible for introducing a note defining the Belgium position on the stationing of 48 cruiser missiles in Belgium. The note has been introduced and this time it appears that it points up the impossibility of waiting until 1981 to make a definite decision, as the Flemish Socialists, in particular have been demanding. Mr Nothomb expects, at the very least, to obtain as early as this Friday an agreement, in principle, on a deployment in 1983 which, in accordance with a formula used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would allow each one to save face. This would seem to imply that he is providing a "way out" that would be acceptable to the Finish Socialists. Once again, this will be a maneuver that requires skillful acrobatics because, during a special meeting on Thursday evening, the SP office issued a communique stating, in particular, that it wants to remain loyal to the commitment undertaken, and that it expects the government's agreement to be fully upheld. The Party added that no decision regarding the placement of nuclear rockets in Belgium soil can be made.

The SP, however, also indicates its willingness to continue its contribution to the implementation of the government's agreement. The Party said: "Make sure that attempts are made to raise again the questions of options to which all governmental partners had subscribed, concerning the installation of these rockets." "The government," the communique goes on to say, "has every interest in fully using the time for consideration specified in the government's agreement."

This communique seems, nevertheless, to be sufficiently moderate in tone in its various paragraphs that it leaves a door open, or, at least, ajar. Mr Van Miert, it appears, does not wish, particularly, to provoke a governmental crisis over euromissiles. But the logical sequence of things may lead to a crisis, because Mr Van Miert's options are incompatible, in principle, with Mr Nothomb's. If one or the other hopes to avoid a crisis, each one will debate those positions which are considered as a point of disagreement.

One or the other will refer to the government's statement in support of these positions as has just been done this Friday morning by Mr De Croo in the RTBF [expansion unknown]. It is true that the text is ambiguous enough--and obviously not by chance--to allow for divergent interpretations. "Within the framework of Belgium's position as set forth by the Prime Minister on September 12, 1979, in the Chamber, in respect to the problem of missiles on Belgium's territory, and taking into account the international situation, the government must continue its initiatives and contacts which have been decided upon to date, and it must examine to what extent and when the conditions will be realized in order to arrive at a decision based upon these elements. Parliament will be placed in the position of fulfilling the role that reverts to it."

Stirrings in Holland

Things, however, are still complicated, in an unexpected way, with the appearance in the low countries of political stirrings caused by the Belgian delays. The CDA [Christian Democratic Union], a christian democratic group to which Prime Minister Van Agt belongs has, in fact, asked the latter to intervene with the Belgian Government so that it will come into line with the position of the low countries, which, as is known, have resolved to make no decision until 1981 on the stationing of cruiser missiles on Dutch soil. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Van der Klaauw (a liberal), on the other hand, had stated, a few days ago in the Chamber, that it was important for the two countries to adopt the same position, adding that he would stay in constant contact with his Belgian colleague.

Euromissiles: A Game to the Finish between Messrs Van Miert and Nothomb.

The above statement had been interpreted by some members of Parliament as pressure being brought to bear on the Belgians to accept the cruiser missiles.

In view of the minister's embarrassment, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly indicated that Mr Van der Klaauw's statements had been misinterpreted and the Netherlands Government had brought no pressure to bear upon anyone. That statement, it was said at The Hague, has been confirmed in Brussels through diplomatic channels. Several members of the Dutch Parliament, however, intend to come back to the charge so as to harass a government that appears to be at the end of its rope.

Finally, on a more international level, and on the eve of Mr Nothomb's departure for the United States where he will meet with Secretary of State Muskie and, he hopes, Mr Gromyko, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, new elements are to be included in the euromissile file. And they are of a type to bring comfort to the position of those who are against the stationing of missiles in Belgium. During his press conference on Thursday, President Carter confirmed that negotiations with the USSR on nuclear weapons in Europe would begin next month. On the other hand, London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) emphasized in its yearly study "The Military Balance 1980-1981" that even the deployment of cruiser and Pershing-2 missiles will not prevent the balance from deteriorating for a number of years to the detriment of the West. And the IISS reminds us that "the nuclear forces (euromissiles) of the NATO theater are presently fewer in number and substantially more vulnerable than comparable systems in the East.

In the conventional sector, the IISS also notes that several countries, two of which are Belgium and Denmark, are not meeting their obligation to increase their military budget by 3 percent in actual terms.

PHOTO CAPTION

- p 3. American paratroops, from Fort Bragg in North Carolina, dropping near Hildesheim in Germany, after a nine-hour flight. These troops are part of a military exercise in which 63,000 soldiers are participating to test the length of time required to deploy reinforcements to Europe.

9766

CSO: 3100

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WARFARE PHILOSOPHY EXPLAINED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 80 pp 164-165

[Article by Bernard Dyle]

[Text] Over the past 20 years it has become a platitude to emphasize the extreme sensitivity of the French economy with regard to maritime transport and to recall the insular nature of this same economy. France presents, in this field, a vulnerability which results from the conjunction of the above phenomenon and the concomitant development of potentially hostile fleets. The threat being exerted on our interests on the high seas proves to be increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, at the very time when its points of pressure are being diversified. Today, Soviet naval forces are present worldwide, while many secondary navies are developing, whose surface-to-surface weapons are regularly increasing in efficiency.

The offensive action capacity therefore appears indispensable in order to counter, on the high seas, limited hostile actions, or, at least, to deter a potential adversary from undertaking them.

The Nuclear Attack Submarine (SNA) constitutes, thanks to its strategic and tactical mobility and its availability, a reply adapted to this threat. Nuclear propulsion confers on it three essential qualities, which constitute a change in the nature of its capacity for action.

The disappearance of the snorkel, which was necessary for recharging the batteries of the conventional diesel submarines, gives it almost absolute discretion with regard to electromagnetic, especially airborne detection. The endurance of the ship in operation is now limited solely by that of its crew.

Sustained transit speed, two or three times greater than that of a conventional submarine, makes possible great strategic and tactical mobility. The SNA can be deployed, quickly and at will, to any theater of operations whatever. It is no longer obliged, contrary to its elder, to respect the narrow framework of pre-programmed missions and can be easily redeployed without seriously undermining its mission potential.

In addition, the rhythm of possible activity of these subs bears only slight relationship to that of conventional submarines. The reliability of the nuclear propulsion, demonstrated with the SNLEs, the progress accomplished with respect to diving safety, makes it possible to envisage 45 to 60 day missions. These subs

without contact with a base port. Thanks to a crew complement, it will be possible to have them do 180 days at sea per year instead of the traditional hundred.

To tactical mobility, which already plays a multiplying factor role, the SNA therefore adds an overall doubling of availability compared with diesel submarines.

An effective destructive arm in open conflict, the SNA makes it possible, in the event of a potential crisis, to bring to bear deterrent pressure adapted to the various forms of blackmail which might be brought to bear on us, especially by virtue of the threat of retaliation and reprisal it represents. The only naval element capable of action in zones under strong enemy control, it radically modifies, by its very existence, the balance of potentialities in favor of friendly forces. Lastly, it is no longer only a lone ranger, acting alone or with others of its kind. Its endurance and speed hoist it to the level of surface elements, with which it can henceforth cooperate effectively, without slowing them down or getting in their way, while the extent of the zones it can cover raises the value of the aid it furnishes or which aircraft can furnish it. A new dimension is added to naval strategy.

The SNA Provence, heading a first series of five submarines, and prelude to a second installment of five others, was launched on 7 July 1979 at Cherbourg.

9330

CSO: 3100

COMMENTATOR SEES TNV TALKS AS RESULT OF NATO PRESSURE

LD140911 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Nov 80 p 3

[Article: "Arne Olav Brundtland: Directly Misleading Stockpiling Debate"]

[Text] "It is directly misleading to claim that we are tying ourselves even more closely to U.S. nuclear strategy, if Norway accepts contingency stockpiles for a U.S. brigade of marines. There is no mention of stockpiling nuclear arms on Norwegian soil! We are not talking about equipping the 155mm guns which will be stockpiled with nuclear shells! It may be true that it is possible to fire nuclear shells from 155 mm guns, but such guns are also standard equipment in the Norwegian Army, and no one could say that this means that our policy on nuclear arms is no longer firm or credible," Arne Olav Brundtland [of the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute] said at the Folk Og Forsvar total defense course in Høevik on Thursday [6 November].

"The essential part of Norwegian nuclear policy is that nuclear arms will not be stockpiled on Norwegian territory during peacetime. But this does not mean that nuclear arms do not play a part in Norwegian security policy. We made a clear division of labor within the alliance when nuclear policy was settled in 1961. There would be no nuclear arms here, but under certain circumstances nuclear arms could be brought to Norway during hostilities. This is still the case. But it is the government which decides whether nuclear arms will be brought here to form a part of Norway's defense," Brundtland said.

"One psychological effect of the Norwegian nuclear policy, which still stands and should continue to stand, is perhaps that the Norwegian people and Norwegian politicians have taken too little interest in the many important and difficult problems raised by nuclear arms and nuclear strategy. It is as if we have mentally rejected such problems because they do not have a direct effect on Norwegian policy," Brundtland said, pointing out that it is easy to slip into a politically unrealistic attitude to nuclear problems.

We were suddenly faced with the nuclear problems for the first time last fall during the nuclear modernization debate, and now once again during the contingency stockpiling debate, when U.S. Presidential Directive 59 has caused a certain amount of confusion.

The main objective behind the NATO resolution from last December was to form a basis for reaching a position for negotiations with the Soviet Union on control of nuclear arms in Europe. It was necessary to show willingness to rearm in order to reach a position for negotiations. It was necessary to show that we were willing to acquire a certain quantity of medium-range missiles so that the Soviet Union would be willing to talk about its medium-range missiles, especially the SS-20. Before the NATO decision the Soviet Union did not want to negotiate, but it was very active in making propaganda against the NATO decision. Once the resolution had become a fact the Soviet Union slowly changed its view, and there are now contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at a SALT III agreement on nuclear arms based in Europe. This development has shown that those who wanted the decision first and the negotiations later are beginning to be proved right, Brundtland said.

"Everything is not perfect in the West's policies, and the need for arms control is urgent, but unilateral disarmament by the West would not lead to corresponding Soviet concessions. Arms control can only come through agreements and only when both parties benefit from it. If the Soviet Union thinks that it can make the West implement unilateral disarmament by pointing to the fears of nuclear war and agitating against the arms race as the root of all evil, the prospects of real arms control will have been weakened," Brundtland said.

CSO: 3108

NATION EXPECTS TO SAVE WITH ELECTRIFICATION OF RAILROADS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Nov 80 p 15

[Text] Copenhagen (Hbl - Alerius) It has become relatively cheaper to ride the train in Denmark since oil and gasoline became more expensive. People are leaving the car at home, and the Danish state railway system is being modernized, face lifted, and electrified. Diesel trains demand oil, while electric trains move with cheaper coal. The change to electricity will cost the state railway system two billion marks, but in the long run it will be worth it, said the director general of the railway system.

Denmark is among the last of the European countries to electrify its railway network. That is a result of the renovation of Danish locomotives in the early 1950's on the basis of diesel, which was ultramodern at the time. Now they are tired after 30 years of linking the Danish islands together.

The new electric locomotives--on which, by the way, Stromberg is bidding as an electronic subcontractor--will be the latest thing. From a technical standpoint they are so advanced that all the power released by braking can be reused. This is called regenerative braking. Furthermore they can use electricity from the normal electrical net and no special generating installations are necessary, as required in the Swedish, Finnish, and German systems. Naturally that will make the change less expensive.

Furthermore the old diesel locomotives were worn out, and would have needed overhaul or replacement. The change will take place over a carefully calculated economic time period. The leaders of the state railway have calculated that the investment is going to yield 18 percent interest annually. Now they plan to buy 120 new electric locomotives and rebuild 243 old bridges. Denmark is full of bridges because the country consists entirely of islands.

The Great Belt bridge was set aside 2 years ago, and there is no doubt whether it will be finished by this generation.

New Ferries

At the same time the state railway will invest in the modernization and reorganization of the ferries. There is a requirement for absolute safety. Ferries must be

as safe as bridges. For example, that is the reason why the three new giant ferries which have just been put in use have six motors, although they really only need four. One motor is in reserve, and one can be under repairs while the ferry is in full operation.

Furthermore they will be manned only by officers. Strikes, which have paralyzed the vital ferry traffic several times during recent years, will therefore be impossible unless the officers law is changed so that they also have the right to strike.

The three new ferries are twice as large as the old. Four trains can be loaded parallel on the train deck. For the present, highway traffic crosses the Great Belt by some other means than the train, but reorganization plans contain a recommendation to take highway and rail traffic over the sound with the same ferries. Car ferries can easily be equipped with a car deck over the train deck.

The reorganization of traffic policies has both domestic and international aspects. The goal for domestic traffic is that each place in the country will have train connections with the rest of the country once each hour. In large sections of Denmark this system is already in effect. Residents of Arhus know that there is a train to Copenhagen 14 minutes past every hour. Copenhagen has train connections to Jutland on the hour.

With the fast ferries and the reorganized loading and unloading it takes no more than 4 - 5 hours to reach the capital from Jutland. It is only a matter of time before the places which have not yet come under this system are also included.

Trains and ferries now are comfortable and modern. The new giant ferries can take 18 railroad cars at a time, which means 1,100 passengers per trip, a doubling of previous capacities. At the same time loading and unloading times have been cut in half. It takes barely one-half hour to unload the ferries in port.

Similar giant ferries may also be a possible solution on the continental route over the Fehmarn Belt to West Germany. In Bonn the traffic authorities have long been interested in a bridge, but the Danes have rejected both the Fehmarn and Oresund bridges as long as Jutland and the Copenhagen area do not have a connecting bridge. Denmark does not want to take the risk that Zealand might become oriented northward toward Sweden and Jutland southward toward Germany, so that the country would no longer hang together. That is vitally important to the business of freight transportation.

Swedish industry's increasing freight between Trelleborg and Saxnits is furthermore a subject of growing concern for Denmark. A countermeasure could be a rapid freight connection directly from Helsinki to Copenhagen, where the free port could get a needed stimulant from such a route. That is the next point on the Danish program for expeditious transportation within and through the country. There is money to be earned through participation in transporting goods from Swedish industry to destinations on the continent.

BRIEFS

NATIONALIZATION, OIL EXPLORATION--The government's 8-month-old fight against A. P. Moller on oil in the Danish underground areas is well on the way to delay increased oil exploration, make it more costly and more difficult. That is the exact opposite of what Energy Minister Poul Nielson wanted to achieve with renegotiation of concession terms. So said director D. S. Keep of Gulf Oil. The company was part of DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] from the beginning but withdrew--after the first Danish oil finds were made--to use its resources in the English part of the North Sea. D. S. Keep told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that Gulf still regards Denmark as a stable country but the harsh moves against DUC would naturally make oil companies thinking of taking part in future exploration in the freed areas considerably more cautious. "And that is probably the exact opposite of what the energy minister intended," said Gulf's English director in Denmark. He also warned the government against setting up new concession terms that would limit the oil companies' flexibility (among other things, nationalization of oil) and prevent reasonable profits on the money invested. But D. S. Keep found it quite natural that the Danish government wants to renegotiate the concessions so that others can participate. Of Gulf's own ideas with regard to exploration the director said that for the time being the company would take a look at the conditions and take it easy. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Nov 60 p 1] [Article by Peter Kjelstrup] 6578

CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

FINNISH-FRENCH CULTURAL AGREEMENT--A protocol on cultural cooperation between Finland and France was signed in Helsinki today. The protocol agrees on the outline of cooperation between the countries in 1981-83, chiefly in the fields of education, scientific research and culture. According to the protocol the teaching of French, for instance, will be increased in such a way that in towns of over 40,000 inhabitants in Finland there should be an opportunity to choose an extended school course of study in the French language. The countries also agreed on increasing scientific cooperation in physics, energy and agriculture and forestry. [Text] [LD201010 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1400 GMT 19 Nov 80]

ICELANDIC PRESIDENT TO DENMARK--Icelandic President Vigdis Finnbogadottir will pay an official visit to Denmark on 25-27 February next year, it was announced in Reykjavik yesterday. Vigdis Finnbogadottir, who assumed the post of Icelandic president on 1 August this year, has been invited by Queen Margrethe of Denmark. [Text] [LD061523 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Nov 80 p 3]

CSO: 3106

DISAGREEMENT AMONG UNIONS HINDERS WAGE DISCUSSIONS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 23 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by gr.: "Disagreements in Austria's Collective Bargaining Round"]

[Text] Vienna, 21 October. With the onset of fall, Austria's traditional collective bargaining round is in full swing. A number of influential workers' groups such as those of the metalworking industry, who are said to exercise some kind of leadership in regard to wages, have already sewn up their new wage agreements. The negotiations of the four public service unions have not yet been concluded. The union of salaried employees of the commerce sector has submitted its demands. As has been the case every year, the negotiations are focusing on increases in the contractual minimum wages and in the "actual" wages exceeding the minimum rates. In the public service sector, this differentiation does not exist: Here the minimum wages are also the maximum rates. In addition, in each case the partners negotiate the payment or increase of diverse supplementary allowances; and in the public service sector in particular, allowances play an important role. In the public service and in the monetary and commercial sectors, the agreements extend over 12 months, while for other workers' groups the contract terms are longer; however, in view of the accelerated rate of inflation, the trade unions of these groups are this year inclined to shorten the contract term to 12 months. For the same reason, this year's agreed-upon rate of pay exceeds that of the previous year, although it is still within a range that justifies ascribing to the Austrian trade unions--particularly in comparison with the position taken by the unions of some other countries--a moderate wage-political line.

Struggle for the Base Wage

In comparison with previous collective bargaining rounds, this year the individual trade unions have more frequently demanded--in addition to the proportionate minimum and "actual" wage increases--a fixed base rate for the lowest wage categories. In the case of the metalworking industry, the employers' divergent reactions to this demand have already led to disputes between them and the individual trade unions and also among various unions. Over this issue, the Gewerkschaft Metall-Bergbau-Energie [Metalworkers,

Miners and Energy Workers Union] and the union of salaried employees in private industry came to blows. The former had at the beginning of September opened the 1980/81 collective bargaining for the approximately 340,000 workers in the metalworking industry and in the trade sector by demanding that the minimum wage be increased--as of 1 October--by 9.8 percent, and the "actual" wages, by 7.8 percent, or at least by 550 schillings per month. In keeping with the ritual, for the approximately 220,000 metalworkers agreement was reached on a wage rate in between the trade union demands and the original offer by the employers, namely 8.1 percent for the minimum and 6.2 percent for the "actual" wages and a contract term of 12 months. However, the union had to forgo the base wage, since the employers had adamantly refused to accede to this demand. As has already been pointed out, the state-owned steel industry--the biggest employer of the group--is in a critical situation, and this probably made it easier for the steel-makers to remain inflexible on this issue.

So the trade unionists were all the more outraged, when shortly afterwards the same negotiating committee of the employers--confronted with the threat of a gasoline supply stoppage--granted the union of salaried employees in private industry such a base rate--which for most branches amounts to 630 schillings--for the majority of the employees in the entire sector, and also in the case of smaller wage increases, namely increases of 7.5 percent for the minimum base wages and 5.9 percent for the wages actually paid. Referring to the employers' alleged promise not to grant base wages to any other trade union group, the metalworkers union thereupon accused the employers of breach of faith. The employers on their part stated they had never made such a promise and they pointed out that the OeGB [Austrian Trade Union Federation] and individual unions insisted on group autonomy and thus recognized neither wage guidelines nor the wage leadership of individual groups.

In fact, in connection with the two wage agreements mentioned, OeGB President Benya has just now expressly and publicly reaffirmed this standpoint. And it is a fact that even without the base wage the metalworkers seem to have done somewhat better than the salaried employees did with the base wage. Nevertheless, the metalworkers union is now demanding supplementary payments. In this regard, however, it has to overcome the resistance coming from among its own ranks, namely on the part of the nationalized steel industry, which regards as excessive even the present contract stipulating an increase of 1 billion schillings per year and which could probably accept a "second helping" only in return for a revision of the contract.

Red Rivalries

The dispute concerning the base wage is very much in the foreground. But behind this dispute, there are intra-union rivalries between Sekanian and Dallinger, the stewards of the metalworkers and of the union of salaried employees in private industry; supported by the two largest trade unions of the country, these two men--ministers in the Kreisky Cabinet and

notorious office collectors, the former an eloquent pragmatist and the latter an intellectual type--are vying to succeed Anton Benya as president of the OeGB. According to observers close to the specialized unions--who point to the recent, very similar public OeGB disputes concerning the (now discontinued) sales of tanks to Chile--the fact that this rivalry could affect the wage negotiations and also lead to public disputes among the individual trade unions proves that as a result of the month-long crisis in the government camp in regard to Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Androsch, the integrative powers of OeGB President Benya--like those of Federal Chancellor Kreisky--have been somewhat diminished.

In the meantime, the employers of the metalworking industry have likewise granted their approximately 120,000 workers the base wage, i.e. 630 shillings, to go with the customary wage-salary increases. Dallinger's union now wants a base wage of 650 schillings for the salaried employees in the commercial sector. In the form of "special regard" for the lowest-paid salaried employees, the base wage will figure large in the wage negotiations of the public service unions as well.

8760

CSO: 3103

PCB OFFERS PLAN TO SOLVE FISCAL, ECONOMIC CRISIS

Brussels LE DRAPEAU ROUGE in French 11/12 Oct 80 pp 6,7

[Text] On the same day that the failure of the tripartite was confirmed and when Wilfried Martens was designated to form a government, the PCB [Belgian Communist Party] held a press conference at Brussels to present its alternative to the crisis. Two receipts of 50 billion:

--recovered on the one hand from big tax evaders;

--on the other hand by taxing the 44,000 very large taxpayers.

Placing of a forced loan of 300 billion (over 3 to 5 years) from the banks, holding companies, and insurance companies.

Defense of purchasing power, a plan for the promotion of employment articulated by regions and controlled by the workers; these are the main lines of this alternative, the details of which follow:

In this situation into which the financial powers and the political forces associated with the government have led the country, any policy of rescue and recovery must first attack the problem of public finance.

The outgoing government states that, even by applying the restrictions which it has provided, the deficit in current operations will reach 90 billion in 1981. It thus aims at convincing public opinion and the working population that there is no other solution than that which it urges.

But it is silent about the fact that annual cost of unemployment alone, in expenses and in failure to earn, will exceed 100 billion--and that this cost results in considerable part from the pattern of public subsidies, focused on destructive "rationalizations" of employment rather than on its protection and growth.

It is equally silent on the annual cost of the interest on the national debt, which alone will exceed 100 billion--and that this cost is primarily attributable to the obstinate refusal of the conservative partners in the coalition to reduce the budget deficit and lighten the weight of the debt itself by fighting seriously against large-scale tax evasion and by taxing large fortunes.

Get the Money Where It Can Be Found in Abundance

No one seriously contests that fact that tax evasion can be estimated in Belgium at some 200 billion francs per year, of which 100 billion is by large taxpayers.

Is it unreasonable under these conditions to propose as a goal that the tax evasion of the "big boys" be reduced, if only by half,--which would represent a quarter of the total amount of tax evasion and would bring back to the coffers of the state some 50 billion per year?

Furthermore, according to the most serious estimates, namely those of the trade unions, 44,000 very large taxpayers possess a total fortune estimated at 3,000 billion, corresponding to an average fortune of about 70 million per family.

Is it unreasonable, with regard to these figures, to propose that these fortunes be taxed at a progressive rate, corresponding to an average of 1.5 percent, close to the rates in effect in several western European countries--which would guarantee the state a second annual receipt on the order of 50 billion?

Of course such measures assume the application of selective control mechanisms specifically designed for very large taxpayers--such as the establishment of a registry of large (real estate) fortunes, verification of large accounts and large back transactions of private individuals, the establishment of exchange controls.

This is above all a question of political will to be made to prevail up to the governmental level both with regard to the adoption of the abovementioned measures and the resort to help for their application which the officials of the finance ministry and the workers of the banking sector, including some officials, are certainly ready to provide.

These two measures would obtain for the state some 100 billion additional receipts.

They would thus make it possible to:

--reject any further retrogressive step, such as those announced by the government for 1981--and even to withdraw the most shocking which derive from the budgetary law for 1980, such as the withholding of 2.18 percent from pensions;

--to reduce considerably the deficit envisaged for current operations;

--to reduce henceforth the resort by the state to the capital market, which would encourage the "spontaneous" lowering of interest rates and the growth of the service on the national debt.

Substitute the Logic of a New Growth for That of Dismantling and Deflation

Already some time ago the Communist Party made known its main proposals for the purpose of getting into gear a new growth model, focused on priority for employment, the satisfaction of the people's needs, and the rebalancing of our foreign trade.

Let Us Describe the Main Lines here:

A. Protection of Purchasing Power and Existing Jobs

1. Safeguarding the people's purchasing power by stopping the attacks against wages and salaries, against indexing, and against Social Security;
2. The halting of closings and dismissals which are not paired with the creation of compensating jobs;

3. Accelerated transition to 36 hours, and even to 35 hours, with compensatory hiring in key sectors;
4. Protection of the level of employment through regulation in wage agreements and under control of the workers in enterprises and sectors affected by the introduction of new technology;
5. Elimination of discriminatory measures affecting, especially in job security, part-time workers, those in training, temporary special staffs, and underpaid workers and employees.

B. Reorientation of Government Subsidies and Deductions In Order To Encourage Employment

1. Stop assistance and orders by the government which favor "rationalization" investments without counterpart or which produce few jobs; limitation of assistance and orders to precise guarantees, verifiable by the workers, in maintenance of employment, reconversion, and rehiring; real sanctions against employers who violate their commitments;
2. Genuinely placing under public law, by government or regional institutions, according to sectors, and excluding all "mixing", viable enterprises threatened with dismantling or liquidation either through the deficiencies of their proprietors or by the wish of financial groups;
3. Redistribution of the social charges of enterprises according to new criteria which encourage, instead of penalizing, high labor-intensive activities and the activities of the mass of small and medium-sized enterprises, at the same time replacing the wage fund, whether subject to ceiling or not, either by the value of assets, or by the added value;
4. Revision, in the spirit of the preceding point, of the current tax assessments of the communal tax authorities, especially at the expense of the enterprises.

C. Total Revival of the Economy and Employment Under the Symbol of a New Growth Mode

1. Implementation of a plan of revival and industrial reconversion, articulated by regions, relying on control by the workers, and focused on:
 - priority to the creation of permanent and socially useful jobs;
 - the satisfaction of needs, particularly in housing, public transportation, telecommunications, education, research, health, and sociocultural services;
 - the rebalancing of our foreign trade, especially through the reduction of our "energy bill" (rational use of energy), the increase of our exports of products of high added value content, the development of our East-West and North-South relations in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.
2. Establishment of a large public economic sector, itself regionally articulated and democratically controlled, which possesses effective levers in the field of energy, credit, and investment for the purpose of taking an essential part in the achievement of the plan;
3. Public control of the distribution of private investments, large at the beginning of the plan options--especially by effective use of the mechanisms of

"contractual planning" (channeling assistance, orders, etc) under the control of the workers;

4. Selective policy of support for small and medium enterprises in order to achieve the goals of the plan, particularly in the job field, in respect for labor legislation and collective bargaining agreements.

Mobilize Available Capital for This Purpose

The implementation of such a plan will of course require the mobilization of large financial reserves by the national and regional authorities.

In the present state of the capital market, resort to "ordinary" loans can hardly be contemplated for this purpose, both because of the tightness of this market, the already prohibitive cost of the public debt, and the handicap which would in the beginning be entailed by the charges which should be attributed to the new activities to be financed.

Nevertheless the holding companies, the banks, and the insurance companies manipulate enormous "mobile" capital which refrain from investing in the productive or socially useful activities of our country and its regions. As the example of the steel industry shows, they have to be begged to honor the apparently most precise commitments which they have signed in the field.

We spoke of enormous mobile capital: was not the Bastin-Yerna group able to demonstrate, on the basis solely of data identifiable by the National Bank, that the export of capital during the last ten years reached the enormous sum of 700 billion, of which 100 billion was in the year 1979 alone? This money was devoted for the most part to purely speculative investments, while the state has to incur foreign debt or pay enormous rates of interest on the Belgian market.

In these conditions is it unreasonable to propose the placement by the state of an obligatory loan from the holding companies, the banks, and the insurance companies...on the order of 300 billion, at a reduced rate of interest of 5 percent for example, to mobilize it over a period of 3 to 5 years, and to finance it by the repatriation of the "mobile" capital according to a redistribution formula to be established?

The proceeds of this loan could, for example, be apportioned as follows, in slices of 100 billion:

--40 billion for the financing of the plan for national recovery and reconversion (investments of the state, the SNCB [Belgian National Railroads], the RTT [Telephone and Telegraph Administration], the Post Office, and a National Investment Company to the extent associated with the achievement of the plan);

--60 billion for the financing of the regional portion of the plan, to be divided among the three regions (including SRI [expansion unknown] and the subordinate authorities) according to the distribution formulae in effect.

Of course, in order to be realizable, such an obligatory loan implies the application of selective control mechanisms of the same type as those invoked in the struggle against major tax fraud and the tax on large fortunes.

This is above all a question of political will, which must be made to prevail on the governmental level.

For there is scarcely any other choice, to stop the decline, to reduce the budgetary deficit without new serious blows against the standard of living and social gains, to get under way a new growth which will produce jobs, than to go and get the necessary money where it is available in abundance, while at the same time asking no profit in any way at the expense of the collectivity.

This is the sense of the three key proposals which at this crossroads the Communist Party submits to the workers, to their organizations, to the popular and democratic forces as a whole. It calls upon them to debate them, to compare them with the regressive options retained by the Martens III government and to mobilize themselves to demand from the representatives of big capital and from the political forces associated with the government that they be placed on the agenda of negotiations where the decisions are not taken in advance.

6108

CSO: 3100

MARTENS GIVES PRIORITY TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM

Fiscal Restraint Advocated

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Oct 80 pp 1,2

[Article by Jacques van Solinge]

[Text] Mr Wilfried Martens is about to embark on the fourth phase of his career as prime minister since his rival in April 1979 at 16 Rue de la Loi. He is now going to set about forming his team. And the task will perhaps be less easy than some optimists of the preceding government, accustomed to seeing only the redistribution of portfolios, think.

The public, moreover, is little concerned in the beginning with the names of the ministers who are going to bludgeon it. What interests it, first of all, is the severity of the drubbing in store for it in the areas concerned with its income and its style of living.

The expression "income policy" always frightens all layers of our society. Now they say "wage moderation" and the political world no longer is ashamed to use it. One can read, from what we are reporting of the conclusion of the bipartite discussions at Lambertmont, that the contemplated practice would go from dissuasion to coercion. There can be no question, at the present moment, of determining--as we will undertake to do--the impact upon each citizen who lives from his work or from the income from his savings. One will have to watch continually the Martens IV government working on its determination and on the manifestations of the latter.

Less spectacular, but at least as interesting in its principle and its intentions, is the "policy" promised for one category of intercommunaux, for their profits, and finally for certain forms of saving. We discuss the problem in detail below.

So one can say literally that Martens IV "is taking off," since he is launching himself toward a sky where there are plenty of air pockets.

Mr Wilfried Martens recently told us, "I could not envisage a government which would have neither the will nor the means to impose sacrifices."

Incontestably the public will not only have to buckle its belt, but also to tighten it.

As everything indicated beforehand, the next Belgian Government will combine the only Socialists and the Social-Christians, or 140 seats out of 212 in the Chamber and 123 seats out of 181 in the Senate. The two great political families of the country thus find themselves face to face once again. It was close to four o'clock in the morning that the CVP [Social Christian Party], the PS [Socialist Party], the SP [spanish unknown] and the PSC [Christian Socialist Party] finally reached an agreement.

Obviously eager to go to bed, the principal advocates limited themselves to a few laconic statements.

-- Paul Vanden Boeynants, president of the PSC: "It would be a lie to say that there were no problems. But we arrived at an honorable and realistic compromise."

-- Karel Van Miert, president of the SP: "I believe that our agreement is a valid basis for a government."

-- Andre Coole, president of the PS: "There was never any reason to be completely satisfied, for no agreement is ever perfect."

-- Wilfried Martens, organizer of the government and virtual prime minister: "I have the honor and the pleasure to announce to you that we have arrived at an agreement for the formation of a government and that we have also agreed on the content of a government program. We have agreed on an ambitious program. I hope that after the Sunday congress the government will be able to begin operations in good conditions and that it will stay until 1983."

The participants in the negotiations proved very sparing with definitive terms on the agreement which should be presented next Wednesday to the legislative chambers. It was understood that all the details on the pact concluded between the Christian Socialists and the Socialists would be unveiled Thursday afternoon at 4 p.m.

For a long-distance runner the last few hundred meters are the hardest. The same is true of political negotiations, especially if they take place in the presence of participants who, like the CVP and the PSC on the one hand, and the PS and the SP on the other, have become so accustomed to having to pretend that they no longer know very well whether they should embrace or throw the common crockery at someone's face.

The Difficult Obstacle

Actually the last night of the discussions was particularly touchy. By raising in extremis the question--unexpected, according to the formateur--of the taxes applicable to mixed companies in charge of distribution of gas and electricity, the socialists of the north and south succeeded beyond all their hopes in creating a deep uneasiness within the Christian-Socialist family. The last day of the negotiations was adorned with many long interruptions of the meeting designed to enable the Christian Socialists to tune the particularly discordant violins: the right wing opposed the Socialist themes, while Christian Democrats agreed to strike a blow at the power of the "electricity bosses".

On several occasions the Social Christian delegates felt the need to huddle separately in order to face the Socialist offensive. In short, it took about 4 days for the future government partners to overcome the obstacle of the mixed inter-communale [elections?].

It should be noted that, beyond doctrinal quarrels, this litigious point affects more than 20 billion francs. Hence the temptation of the Socialists to exchange their "electric resistance" for a certain flexibility on the subject of the moderation of incomes.

On this last point it was decided to keep what had been initially planned for the public authorities and for the incomes of the liberal professions, namely putting it off for 1 year; and the limitation of increases to the consumer price index during the following year.

As for the incomes of salaried persons and those receiving stipends, it is said that it was decided to leave it to the next extraordinary national Labor conference to choose from among three solutions:

- the government decides that any salary increase provided by a collective agreement concluded after 1 October 1980 would be distributed as follows over a period of two years: half for the worker, the other half being deposited by the employer in a Solidarity Fund destined to favor the reclassification of job seekers; it being understood that the proprietor would have to deposit a complementary sum equal to half the salary increase officially granted;

- the government decides to limit for 2 years all wage increases to the rise of the index;

- the government decides to discourage all enterprises from granting the slightest wage increase in excess of the index by withdrawing from them the benefit of the economic expansion laws or tax exemptions.

It will therefore be up to the negotiating social groups (employers, trade unions, farmers, and independents) to make their choices.

In another rubric, it should be noted that the negotiators decided that the statements of the regional and community executives would not be annexed to the government agreement. The executives will make their explanations autonomously before their assemblies. It is known that the PSC suspects the PS of wanting to profit to the utmost from its position of strength in the Walloon region.

In principle, then, it will be early next week--in other words after the party congresses--that the next government, already baptised "Martens IV" will be constituted.

Mr Martens has doubtless passed through the eye of the needle. He was nevertheless not wrong in saying that the negotiations which have just been completed were particular short. It remains to be seen what will be the duration of "Martens IV". Any prognostication is hazardous at the very least.

Employment Program Stressed

Brussels LE NOIR in French 18 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Absolute priority for jobs--that is the order of the day of the Martens IV government in its recovery plan. Government action in this field will be taken in direct collaboration with the representatives of the various groupings (employers, trade unions, etc.) and, more generally, with the traditional agencies such as the National Labor Council.

The specific programs already under way will be continued; this is the case with the difficulties experienced by the steel industry, textiles or apparel. To these sectors the government document adds that of construction, and small and medium enterprises as well (PME) for which a supplementary effort will be made. The rubric of job policy ended with a catalogue of government proposals on "real" reduction of incomes: a kind of minifreeze.

To stimulate the construction sector, the government proclaims, among others, the following measures:

- temporary restoration of the 10 percent VAT (Value Added Tax) for new dwellings destined for occupancy by their owners; this same VAT will apply also to the remodeling of dwellings. This restoration may not exceed 400,000 francs, however, and it will have to reflect the cost of construction. This measure will be applied until 31 December 1981;

- establishment, within limits yet to be defined, of a right of preemption, in order to encourage public housing and urban renewal.

Three Billion for the PME

Some 3 billion francs will be devoted to alleviating burdens and stimulating employment in the PME:

- 1.5 billion is destined for relieving the burdens of small enterprises, particularly by raising the thresholds of social contributions;

- 1.5 billion will be applied toward employment in the PME. Among the measures provided for by the government, particularly noteworthy is the encouragement of young people and the unemployed to set themselves up in independent business, and measures designed to encourage the hiring of extra workers by the PME;

- a "development contract for the PME" will be established by common agreement with the various groupings. The main chapters of this contract are: access to credit and export, management assistance, etc.

"Part-Time" Work

Specific measures will be taken to promote employment. The government recovery plan thus provides, among other dispositions, for:

- search for a greater flexibility in the organization of work by resort to variable schedules, particularly:

-- harmonization and eventual integration--within a time limit--within a single regime of the system of the special temporary staff and that of the unemployed put to work;

-- the strengthening of the struggle against multiple job-holding, clandestine work, and the systematic limitation of overtime.

Moderation of Incomes

To conclude the category of the recovery plan relating to employment policy, several steps toward the "real" moderation of incomes are advanced by the government. All incomes are affected, those of the private sector as well as the public sector, those of the liberal profession and those of the self-employed, the same as the political and public authorities.

The system of indexing remuneration to the price index is kept and confirmed. According to the government, the moderation of incomes will have to be achieved by one of the three following ways:

-- by the limitation of the increase of all incomes for a period of 24 months, starting 1 October this year; this limitation would be decided through an inter-professional agreement;

-- the limitation of all new wage gains which would exceed the index and which would derive from collective labor agreements concluded after 1 October 1980. This limitation, extending over 24 months, would operate as follows: the workers would collect only half of the new increases, the other half being deposited by the employer into a solidarity fund. Into this same fund the employers will pay in addition a sum equal to half of these same increases. Example: if the wage increase granted is 2000 francs, the worker receives only 1000 francs, the other 1000 francs going to the solidarity fund, which still receives an additional 1000 francs from the employer. The operation therefore costs the latter 3000 francs.

-- the suspension of all aid granted by the state (especially with regard to taxes, economic expansion or any subsidies) to sectors or enterprises where the new collective bargaining agreements grant increases which raise wages above the index.

These measures of wage moderation will be subject to coordination with regard to the choice of the path to follow and on the level of effects on employment.

...and "forced loan"

The remuneration of the liberal professions will be frozen for a duration of 12 months at their 1 October level. In the following 12 months, they may not exceed the indexing of the preceding 12 months. The political and public authorities will, for their part, be reduced by 5 percent starting on 1 January 1981.

The administrators and managers of Belgian companies will collect in 1981 percentages reduced by 5 percent compared with the sums collected in 1980. Furthermore the government intends to find a formula to oblige recipients of incomes of more than 5 million to subscribe for two years a part of their income in state loans or new stock, which thereafter some people are calling the "forced loan".

SPITAEELS INTERVIEWED ON FLEMISH-WALLOON SOCIALIST ANTAGONISM

Brussels SPECIAL, L'EVENTAIL in French 19 Sep 80 pp 10-12

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications Guy Spitaels: "Conversation With Guy Spitaels," date and place not given]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications Guy Spitaels has accepted to answer the sometimes very direct questions submitted to him by one of our editors.

[Question] The first question is quite nasty: In 1978, at the time of the break-up of the PSB-BSP, the Francophone Socialist Party said that the break-up was caused by the contradiction which existed between socialism as conceived in the North of the country and as conceived in the South. The Flemish people were called social-democrats adopting the SPD (Social Democratic Party) of Chancellor Schmidt and the Scandinavian countries as models. This "Germanic" concept was in contrast to the more "Latin" one, that is to say the more radical and Jaures-style of the Walloon socialists and the francophone inhabitants of Brussels. Today, after the Chairman of the Flemish Socialist Party took such strong positions, is it not the Walloon Socialist Party which appears to be Social Democratic?

[Answer] Maybe on the face of it but it is completely superficial. The entirely different economic conditions which exist in the North and in the South of the country ultimately determine the different kinds of socialism.

In Wallonia, all the basic industries have collapsed. First the mines, then the glass and the steel industries. This collapse has also resulted in the collapse of many small industries. Therefore, our main concern is to create new employment through the industrial modernization of our region. Because the private sector is not playing its part, inevitably we have to rely on the industrial initiative of the public sector to realize this modernization. The Flemish people are not in the same situation. The political trend of both our parties is affected by it and their paths are therefore diverging more and more. This is the root of the problem.

In addition, there is also another answer to your question, a more specific one. In Flanders, the Socialist Party is the second most important party. It is in a position to harass the CVP (Flemish Social Christians) and to try to rally a substantial portion of the youth by taking a few risks. The Walloon Socialist Party is the main political power of the French speaking community and of Wallonia. It

is in power in numerous provinces, towns and municipalities. It would take on itself a frightful responsibility.. (One line was omitted in the French text).. against the rising price of gas.

[Question] According to you, the antagonism between Walloon and Flemish socialists might become deeper. But now that regionalization has been achieved or is about to be, it might be a good thing for the national parties to be re-organized. In the old days, it was at the party level that many problems were solved which today still have a communal character. Moreover, in the federal or regional states, the political formations are always national.

[Answer] In the FRG there are the CDU and the CSU....

[Question] ...which present a common candidate for the position of chancellor.

[Answer] In Canada, the Conservative Party is practically anglophone and the Liberal Party francophone.

And in any case, in Belgium the fact is that no great traditional political family has ever succeeded in maintaining its unity. It is a fact as well that in our country any problem becomes a community problem. I am known for not representing community problems but economic and social ones. It is that man who says to you that at present all problems are charged emotionally by the community aspect.

[Question] Is it not first of all the fault of a certain press rather than the fault of some politicians?

[Answer] I want to keep to the facts. The last attempt at unity was Omer Vanaudenhove's. It failed. In Brussels, even Vanden Boyenants has given up. Let him try to share Charbet's ticket!

[Question] When he did so in 1968, he obtained more than 120,000 votes of preference. In 1978, he only had 50,000 votes.

[Answer] In any case, I am rejoicing that the regionalization will allow us to proceed on our own.

I am sorry about the opposition between communities but I take note of them and think that they stem from the fact that the North and the South are confronted by different problems. In the economic sector, for example, our attachment to the public industrial initiative is not the result of a doctrinal prejudice but simply the result of a necessity. We often say that institutional problems do not interest anyone and that the public opinion is preoccupied first of all with the economy and the social matters. I am ready to believe it but I repeat: the economic and the social matters are always closely related to the community problems. In that regard, I hope, the institutional reforms we negotiated successfully will play a pacifying role.

[Question] Do you really think so? If a regional executive decides to subsidize a bolt factory or a garter factory, is not the other region going to protest that this factory will unfairly compete with a firm which already exists in the region?

[Answer] It is worth trying. If it fails it will be serious.

[Question] Was it necessary going into a venture which does not leave any alternative in case of failure? Lucien Outers seems to have talked very lightly about the "Belgian divorce." When spouses get divorced, they do not carry on living under the same roof or operate the same business. For geographic reasons, the Flemish and Walloons are condemned to coexist. It would have been better to promote their mutual understanding rather than institutionalize their dissensions.

[Answer] But we did not do it. And today I notice that even in the ministerial departments which remain national, such as communications, regional and community problems arise very often. At present, provinces and municipalities have at their disposal relatively large funds provided by the state. This does not cause any conflict between them.

[Question] You are now raising indirectly the problem of financing. You know very well that the community parties are talking of "phoney regionalization" since these regions and communities will not have sufficient financial means. Now, under the present conditions the State is not in a position to provide them.

[Answer] The lack of funds given the regions and communities is tremendously exaggerated. One must keep in mind that there are a number of credits in the national budgets which are de facto regionalized or communitized. National education for example. Of course, the ministers have to stick to it according to the school agreement but they do retain a large amount of autonomy to manage their own communities. Likewise, there are sums which go to the provinces and the communities which are practically regionalized although listed in the budget of the Interior [Ministry].

[Question] One last question which links up with the first one: In the famous 2 percent affair which has not helped the Government to be more credible, if one adopts the socialist point of view, has not Karel Van Miert adopted an attitude which conforms more to the socialist point of view than Andre Cools?

[Answer] I acknowledge that there is more unity of action between the trade unions and the Flemish Socialist Party than with the Walloon Socialist Party. I think the reason is that certain leaders of the Walloon FGFB (General Federation of Labor of Belgium) denigrated the regionalization as it has been put into law. In Flanders, no one is contesting it.

This said, I agree that the Government made the mistake of not having discussed the matter before taking such measures. This was even more regrettable since we encouraged negotiations in the private sector and that we have to negotiate a new collective wage agreement with the agents of the public sector.

Because we had to prepare the budget in such a hurry, we had to skip a stage which proved to be indispensable.

[Question] Haste due to the fact that the Government and the Parliament had devoted all their time to institutional problems!

[Answer] That was not the only reason. The Government can draw a positive balance sheet in regard to its actions in other sectors.

After the community marathon, the Government decided on the State budget for 1981. Of course, it is true that the measure has to be re-discussed without delay but this amount of 6 billions (of Belgian francs) which must be retained, must not be the tree which hides the forest. The budget work has been done.

I would not risk making any forecast of what will come out of these endless discussion sessions which are going to take place over the next weeks.

But even if the past, even the recent past, could guarantee the near future, I would like to remind you that the Law-Program voted by the Parliament last August contained financial measures amounting to 90 billions (of Belgian francs) and that this was also achieved through patient negotiations which for the past 3 years have spared this country from the fluctuations experienced by other countries which are suffering from the crisis as much as this country is.

Biographical Notice

49 years old, Mr Guy Spitaels has had a late but exceptionally rapid career in politics. We thought he was devoted to university education and he appeared to be the heir apparent of Professor Arthur Doucy at the head of the Institute of Sociology of Brussels University, when in 1973, after Mr Edmond Leburton, elected Prime Minister, offered him the position of head of the ministry of economics.

One year later, at the elections following the downfall of the Government, Mr Spitaels was elected senator of the Belgian Socialist Party for the district of Ath-Tournai-Mouscron. In 1977, in the third government of Mr Tindemans, Mr Spitaels accepted the ministry of employment and labor and gave his name to the work plan for young unemployed persons.

In the two first governments of Martens, he was given the position of Deputy Prime Minister as well as the ministry of the budget. In this present government, he has kept his functions as Deputy Prime Minister representing the Walloon Socialist Party in the Cabinet but exchanged the budget for communications.

9755

CSO: 3100

COMMENTS ON THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS' RESOLUTION ON RIGHTS OF ENGLISH SPEAKERS

Rights of English Speakers

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 6 Oct 80 p A 5

[Article by Pierre Vincent: PQ Council Divided on Rights of English Speakers. Lévesque had to settle the matter]

[Text] Should certain rights of the English-speaking minority of Quebec be recognized and defended, yes or no? The delegates voting yes numbered 229, while 251 others very noisily responded no.

Party chief René Lévesque tried at the very last moment of the expanded National Council of the Parti Québécois to put the entire question in a more electoral and just perspective. The official program of the party does not pose such a problem and "it is the program which will be applied," he said.

But this will not remove the doubt which will last for a long time in the minds of the public concerning the real desire of the rank-and-file militants of the Parti Québécois to protect the rights of the English-speaking minority.

The whole affair began at the presentation of a resolution aimed at "recognizing the rights of the English-speaking minority to its social and cultural institutions and assuring their respect, whatever may be the constitutional future of Quebec.

If the resolution had been adopted, it would have allowed the speakers during the next electoral campaign to silence the "horsemen of the Apocalypse" who are accusing us of indulging in genocide of the English-speaking minority," according to a statement by the Minister of State for Cultural Development Dr Camille Laurin.

The delegates listened patiently and politely to Dr Laurin's explanations. Then the first speaker to intervene complained that "we are subsidizing universities and hospitals where they cannot even speak our language." She received a warm applause.

The next speaker repeated essentially what the first had said, concluding that he was not very enthusiastic with the idea that "we should recognize the rights of those who refuse to recognize ours." His comments were met with even stronger applause.

Then finally the close vote defeating this resolution, which was presented by the Deputy of Rosemont Mr Gilbert Paquette.

Before the meeting was adjourned, Mr Denis Perron, deputy of Duplessis, tried in vain to have the vote reconsidered. He was unable to get his suggestion accepted because of a question of procedure. In any event it was already useless to continue pouring salt in the "wound": what had been said had already been repeated over the English radio broadcasts.

Mr Lévesque, who excused "that understandable reaction to 20 May," nevertheless tried to dissipate any misunderstanding on the question: "We do not have the power today to change the party program; thus the program still applies. In particular, the program clearly states that the government of the PQ assumes responsibility for offering the English-speaking minority instruction in English on all levels. In addition, Law 101 offers our English-speaking fellow citizens civilized guarantees and there is no question that not an iota will be changed.

"Our best defence in view of federal force, as concerns linguistic rights, lies exactly in the civilized manner with which we treat our English-speaking minority," concluded Prime Minister Lévesque.

He was applauded just as warmly as the speakers who had defeated the resolution, but for all that the matter was not closed....

Party Blunders

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 7 Oct 80 p 16

[Article by Jean-Pierre Proulx: A Spectacular Blunder.]

[Text] Recognition of the English-speaking community and its institutions has always been and is still a stumbling block for the Parti Québécois. There was a new demonstration of this Sunday during the expanded National Council of this when the delegates refused, if only by a slight majority of 22 votes, "to recognize the English-speaking minority's rights to social and cultural institutions and to assure their respect, whatever may be the constitutional future of Quebec."

Paradoxically the committee of nine which wrote the Council's working document entitled: "Quebec of the 80s" affirmed in all serenity that "the Parti Québécois recognizes the rights of the English-speaking minority of Quebec to maintain its current institutions (schools, social services, media) which give it its cohesion." The thinkers had thus preceded the party.

The government also took precedence over the party when Dr Camille Laurin announced during the debate on the notorious resolution that in a few weeks he would make known his new policy concerning the "cultural communities," which appears to be the currently acceptable label describing what used to be called "ethnic groups."

The prime minister and president of the Parti Québécois, Mr Lévesque, emphatically affirmed Sunday that the government would not in any way change the institutions of the English-speaking population or the official program of the party, which already explicitly speaks of the "rights" of the English-speaking minority. The party had thus preceded the party. This had probably been forgotten.

Thus what actually did transpire Sunday and why? The most widely accepted explanation is that the council reacted animatedly although not necessarily consciously to the event of 20 May but especially to the sly trick of Mr Trudeau. Two days before the congress, Mr Trudeau announced modifications to the Canadian constitution whose more or less short-term effects would be to render inoperable the current provisions of Law 101 as concerns the language of instruction. But at almost the same time, the militants of the PQ were asked to recognize as such, without question, the "rights" of the English-speaking population. Seen from that angle, the reaction of the militants of the PQ were asked to recognize as such, without question, the "rights" of the English-speaking population. Seen from that angle, the reaction of the militants is understandable. It is an affirmation, clumsy, it is true, but nevertheless still necessary, of the respect due to the French-speaking community. In other words, the militants were practically asked to turn the other cheek. The majority of them preferred rather to shake the dust from their sandals.

The action of the National Council is no less regrettable: the democratic ideal that our society should strive for is not only that of self-respect. Law 101 fortunately was a step in that direction--but also respect for those different from the majority. The representatives of the PQ who have refused to recognize the English-speaking community's rights to its cultural and social institutions have certainly lost sight of that ideal.

Moreover, their action is regrettable for political reasons. It reinforces the thesis of the head of the Liberal Party of Quebec, Mr Claude Ryan, whose view is that the Parti Québécois is in fact incapable of recognizing the English-speaking community of Quebec and that it will only tolerate it. In particular, it will make the task of the militant English-speaking party members more difficult. These militants, some of whom will probably be candidates at the next elections, will have to explain to their electors the party's policy concerning the English-speaking community. We can assume that they will be confronted with the National Council's decision of Sunday 2 October 1980.

A word should be said about the resolution itself. The debate, which was necessarily too short, would not have allowed determining with much precision what was meant by the so-called "right of the English-speaking minority to its social and cultural institutions." Certainly common sense already provides the first answer to that question. Everyone knows that in Quebec there are hospitals, social services, school commissions, and universities where traditionally everything is conducted first and foremost in English. These institutions, many of which formerly were private, are now part of the public network. Even though these institutions were subjected to a process of Frenchification by Law 10, they still remain English. The resolution if properly voted should eventually have led the government to admit that fact.

But these institutions are English-speaking by tradition. What does that mean exactly, to recognize "by law" that they belong to the English-speaking community? Even though harmless in appearance, that question is no less complex in a legal sense. Is it necessary, for example, to legally consecrate such and such an institution as being English-speaking? Or rather is it necessary to provide a legal definition of the English-speaking community itself and take a census of the French-speaking community as will be done in Ontario to determine those who wish to be a part of it. Since the militants of the PQ wanted time to reflect, it certainly

would be useful for them to try to furnish answers to these questions. They could take note in passing that the PLQ (Liberal Party of Quebec) already recorded in its beige book that "wherever they will be grouped in sufficient number, the communities of people speaking French, English and the aboriginal languages should be allowed to manage the public institutions providing instruction in their mother tongue."

The management of the collective rights of minorities is thus seen as a dangerous exercise for the majority. In that respect the PQ Sunday committed a spectacular blunder. It will certainly pay the price. Let us hope that it does not fail to rectify it.

9178

CSO: 3100

PROFILE ON ALEXIS GHALANOS PUBLISHED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 2 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by John Neves]

[Text]

THE CHAIRMAN of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives believes in the destiny of the centre in Cyprus politics in a way that might evoke incredulity in a Western European observer.

All over Europe the parties of the centre — the liberals — are hard put to it to keep 10% of the vote; they live in the shadow of the big parties of the left and right, and generally survive by accepting partnership on unequal terms in coalition governments.

Alexis Ghalanos rejects such a subservient role for the Cypriot centre (curiously shy of calling itself liberals) out of hand. He calculates that the various centre forces in Cyprus command about 35% of the vote.

Not all political analysts would agree with him on that point; but they would support his contention that Cyprus is a notable exception to the rule of liberal weakness in contemporary European politics.

* * *

However, even if one accepts that there is a strong long-term groundswell in favour of the centre, it has to be admitted that the near-total disarray of their forces

at the present time could easily lead to their eclipse in the coming elections.

The endless in-fighting of the past months has disillusioned Ghalanos to the point where he is not sure whether he will stand for re-election in the spring.

This is much to be regretted, for the centrist forces are in urgent need of leaders with a clear vision of a liberal future for Cyprus. In the split between the President and Abdo Michaelides Ghalanos has backed the President, but he is worried about his prospects of leading the Democratic Party into the elections and beyond. Ghalanos wants order and a sense of direction to return before he will commit himself to a lifetime in politics.

He was born in Limassol in 1946, the son of a self-made man who had built up a business importing sugar, rice, cereals and other foodstuffs. He attended the Pancyprrian Gymnasium in Nicosia, and then transferred to the American-run Athens College in the Greek capital, which has some connections with the American University of Beirut.

Ghalanos was a good scholar, and found time to become a notable performer in track and field sports, and also basketball. His studies at Athens College coincided with the EOKA struggle in Cyprus, and he took part in

the distribution of leaflets calling for enosis.

In 1955 he graduated from the school and went to London to prepare for the G.C.E. exams at the City of London College. He passed them with flying colours and found himself confronted with the choice between studying at King's College, Cambridge and the London School of Economics. He chose Cambridge.

Cambridge seems to have given him a lot — it affected everything from his power to make clear-cut intellectual decisions to his very English personal appearance.

«We were taught to think and tackle problems, he says. Among those who taught him to think was the renowned economist Nicholas Kaldor. Another inspiring influence was the Provost of King's, the outspoken liberal Noel Annan.

Ghalanos' leanings at the time were rather left of centre. He was fully convinced by the liberal neo-Keynesian economic orthodoxy of the time, but joined the university Labour club.

Meanwhile he continued to participate in sporting activities. He enjoyed a many-faceted life which did not prevent him from getting a good degree in economics in 1963.

He was no less attracted by the law than by economics, and had in fact enrolled at the Inner Temple in 1960. Now he returned to Cyprus and sat down to a solitary course of legal study, punctuated by long visits to London during which he attended Gibson and Weldon's legal school.

He passed his bar exams with considerable distinction, but inexplicably failed to complete the formalities required for being actually called to the bar. (He still needs to eat one more dinner at the Inner Temple — a requirement which he will probably complete next year).

He had in any case no intention of practising law in Cyprus. His legal and economic expertise were intended to assist him in business (and later in politics). In 1966 he became really active in his father's firm, which came to be run by a triumvirate consisting of his father, his uncle and himself.

For eight years the business expanded steadily, as Alexis Ghalanos brought his youthful enthusiasm and intelligence to bear on the problem of diversifying into industry.

A cold store was established in Larnaca, enabling the firm to go into the frozen meat business. Flour mills were established in Famagusta, as was a biscuit factory, manufacturing English biscuits under licence.

The Ghalanos family became partners in an enterprise manufacturing detergents in Larnaca under licence from Unilever. They also bought shares in the Phassouri plantations, entering into a close collaboration with George Tsimon, the future Mayor of Kyrenia.

Had there been no Turkish invasion, Ghalanos might well have steered clear of politics for the rest of his life. Archbishop Makarios tried to interest him in a political career, but the problems of Cyprus were clouding over with Eoka B coming increasingly active, and Ghalanos has never liked to fish in troubled waters. He saw the threat to the status quo in Cyprus implied by the continued hankering after enosis, and refused to get involved.

In any case life at Famagusta was very pleasant in those days for a young man with a taste for swimming and the open-air life. The business was prospering, and

seemed to offer greater rewards of all kinds than politics. The events of 1974, however, pushed Ghalanos into public life.

It was a time when everyone was pulling together to mount a rescue operation for Cyprus. He felt he had to throw his weight behind the efforts to achieve a just solution for the island.

On the political side, Ghalanos joined a delegation of Rotarians who visited Makarios in London in August 1974 and pressed him to return to Cyprus. He went on to the United States where he became a founder member of the American-Hellenic Society, which helped to get the American arms embargo imposed on Turkey. On the economic side he became a director of the Central Bank and Vice-President of the Cyprus Employers' Federation.

Ghalanos' increasing involvement in politics after 1974--which took on a long-term aspect in 1976 when he joined the newly formed Democratic Party of Spyros Kyprianou--seems to have been a response not only to the tragedy of Cyprus, but also to the sharper feeling of national identity that resulted from it.

People were pooling their efforts to help the state recover from the knock-out blow it had received. He does not like to play the political game when the spirit of solidarity is missing.

For a couple of years after the invasion he had to devote most of his time to shoring up that part of the family business that remained intact--the occupation of Famagusta and the northern sector of Nicosia had hit it hard.

The banks stepped in with loans, but their repayment was to be a heavy burden on the firm in the years to come. Turnover never recovered to the level of 1974 in real terms.

In the general election of 1975 Ghalanos was elected as a member of the Democratic Party for the Famagusta refugees. At first he imagined he could look after his business alongside his work in the House, but it was not long before he was spending 90% of his time on public affairs.

Financially his political work was a sheer loss to him, but he accepted his new role in society in a spirit of collaboration with everyone else who was trying to salvage what they could of the Republic of Cyprus.

He represents a refugee constituency, and wants to see the rights of the refugees to return to their homes safeguarded, but rejects the "no concessions, no compromises" line of other refugee leaders.

He wants to see an elastic approach to the Cyprus problem applied. Important territorial concessions could be made, he thinks, in return for a federal constitution that restores the substance of unity to the island. If the talks lead to a compromise solution in this direction, he would like to see it put to the people in a referendum.

Chalanos' reflective stance in politics has earned him criticism, because political commentators have not understood that it is in his nature to judge each move on its merits. He has not felt able to support President Kyprianou's current economic policy, for example. But he has been generous in accepting the President's implied admission that he was mistaken in his policy on the national issue, and has backed him wholeheartedly now that he has changed course.

He regards himself as Kyprianou's man so long as he represents the Famagusta refugees on the basis of the 1976 election, and by and large he is happy with the overall direction of government policy.

Chalanos speaks with considerable confidence on economic affairs which is hardly surprising considering his background. As a liberal, he would like to see more economic equality in Cyprus, and believes this could be achieved by a more progressive fiscal policy.

He remains, however, an apostle of private enterprise, and thinks the impoverishment of a large section of the middle class as a result of the invasion was a disaster for Cyprus.

He has the classic liberal distrust of the innate expansionism of the civil service, and would like to see it pruned as part of a programme of cuts in the budget, the size of which he feels is unhealthy for the economy.

Another area in which he would like to see changes is the government's policy towards the European Community. Although fundamentally in favour of association with the EEC, he believes the present arrangement is proving unnecessarily costly to both agriculture and industry.

If it is clear that a man of the intellectual training and practical experience of Chalanos, with his commitment to the centrist policies characteristic of the Republic since its birth could play a valuable role in Cyprus politics, it is equally clear that he will have to overcome his hesitating attitude in order to do so.

Cyprus is of course, suffering from a crisis of leadership in the centre of politics at present, but Chalanos will have to make a decision as to his future fairly soon. He has said that he will judge President on his policies alone. As a talented political thinker, with a potential appeal to a broad cross-section of the population, it is a matter of urgent necessity for him to nail his colours to the mast.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON FAMAGUSTA CRITICIZED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 p 32

(Text)

The Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Famagusta would have gone back to their town two years ago if the government had handled the whole issue correctly, Mr Constantinos Lordeas, chairman of the Famagusta Refugee Movement has said.

Speaking at the annual conference of the Movement in Limassol, he claimed that opportunities were lost for the return of the town when Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash made his first offer in July 1978.

He said "Denktash spoke about 35,000 Greek Cypriots returning to the town. And this was the total number of inhabitants then. So he does not disagree with us that the entire population of the town should be allowed to return".

Western plan

Mr Lordeas, a Famagusta businessman, also defended the Western (American) plan which, he said, had some similarities with the Denktash proposal since it provided for the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the resumption of full-scale inter-communal talks.

He said if the Cyprus government had then handled

the whole issue correctly, it would have won Famagusta back, since Turkey was at the time desperately trying to have the American arms embargo lifted and was also in urgent need of financial aid.

Referring to the present negotiations on Varosha, Mr Lordeas called on the two sides to exchange comprehensive proposals concerning the extent of the area where resettlement takes place and the nature of the town's temporary administrative status.

'First bridge'

Agreement on Famagusta would form the starting point, the key, to a future Cyprus settlement, he declared, adding: "It will be the first bridge—to be followed by many others—in order to close the abyss separating the two communities".

He stressed that any agreement should provide for free entry and exit, with control limited to the minimum by the UN to ensure that the town will remain a demilitarized and disarmed area. Furthermore the laws of the Republic should apply.

Mr Lordeas rejected Turkish assertions that the resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Famagusta would pose a security problem for the Turks.

Security

He said "There cannot be a security problem for a community which is protected by a 30,000 strong army and 400 tanks, not to mention the Turkish Air Force which is only six minutes' flight away. On the contrary it is for the people of Varosha that there will be a security problem, since they will be living daily next to this terrible armour while their own area will be totally demilitarized".

The President of the House of Representatives Mr Alecos Michaelides also spoke about Famagusta when he met the group of foreign correspondents from Athens.

He said "The resettlement of Famagusta would be an extremely important development which would help in promoting a solution to the Cyprus problem".

"A large number of refugees would return to their homes. Famagusta would be a town policed by the UN and a situation would be created where Greek and Turkish Cypriots could come into friendly contact and enter into a cooperative relationship".

But he also stressed that Famagusta should be a "free town". "We cannot create an enclave of Greek Cypriots within the occupied area who would be subject to eviction any time".

SOVIETS BLASTED FOR MOCKERY

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Nov 80 p 32

(Text)

The Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus Mr Sergei Astavin yesterday repeated the Soviet Union's "firm and consistent support" for Cyprus, but a Greek Cypriot independent daily asked Moscow to "stop this mockery".

Mr Astavin, speaking at a gathering in Nicosia to mark the 63rd anniversary of the October Revolution, said the Soviet Union firmly backed Cyprus' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and was against "every form of partition". It wanted an end to foreign interference, withdrawal of foreign troops and elimination of foreign bases.

Hilarity

A columnist in "Agon" newspaper, commenting on similar earlier statements by the Soviet Embassy's press attache Mr Ivan Sharov, remarked: "Such academic declarations that the Soviets are

against foreign interference in Cyprus affairs cause only hilarity among the Cyprus people - if they do not constitute a sheer mockery".

"Observer", the columnist, said Cyprus has been the victim of foreign interventions for the past six "tragic years", without the Soviet Union feeling the need "to move even its small finger to stop such interventions".

He referred to the coup and the first and second Turkish offensive and said the USSR did nothing to stop or avert them.

The newspaper stressed the Greek Cypriots wanted "practical help", not mere declarations. "If the Soviet Union cannot offer what Cyprus expects, at least it should not add insult to injury. The last six years have made the Cypriots realise that the Soviet Union does not want to prevent foreign interventions against our country, nor can it provide us with help in a more practical manner", the newspaper added.

STATISTICS ON 1981 BUDGET PUBLISHED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 31 Oct 80 p 1

(Text)

A NEW RECORD ORDINARY BUDGET OF £180 MILLION FOR THE COMING YEAR WAS TABLED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES YESTERDAY WHICH WILL LEAVE £11 MILLION SURPLUS FOR TRANSFER TO THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET TO BE TABLED LATER.

The main source of revenue comes from the direct and indirect taxes which will between them yield £166 million or £34 million more than the budgeted figures for 1980. The overall receipts include a £10 million grant from the Greek government about the same as last year.

The Finance Ministry in accompanying notes explains that the budget is in line with the government's austerity policy aimed at reducing deficits as much as possible, though consumption and development expenditures are mostly inelastic and savings cannot be made to the desired extent.

An analysis of the sources of revenue shows that indirect taxes at £81.3 million are the biggest source (£15.2 m. more than in the 1980 budget), and nearly 50 per cent of all receipts.

Direct taxes at £54.7 million represent an increase of £19 million over the 1980 budgeted figure and constitute about one third of all receipts.

Breakdown

The following is a breakdown of the £180 million revenue side of the budget.

Direct taxes	£54.7 m.
Indirect taxes	81.3 m.
Services and sale of goods	9.7 m.
Rents and Royalties	9.8 m.
Transfers	7.6 m.
Greek government grant	10.1 m.

Proceeds from loans	5.4 m.
Others	1.5 m.

The expenditure side shows that social welfare and education take the biggest share with security and defence close behind. The total expenditure of £189.3 million is broken up thus:

Public administration	£22.3 m.
Public Security	17.7 m.
Defence	11.3 m.
Education	25.6 m.
Public health	12.4 m.
Social welfare	36.5 m.
Housing etc.	3.0 m.
Agriculture and rural development	8.3 m.
Commerce and Industry	1.2 m.

Communications and transport	7.7 m.
Public debt	20.6 m.

The Income Tax chapter shows that it will provide £41 million of which £27 million by individuals and 14 million by corporations. The overall figure is £12 million more than that in the 1980 budget.

Other direct taxes include the newly introduced unmovable property tax which is expected to yield £6 million.

In the chapter on indirect taxes the item for Customs at £18 million shows the biggest increase (£10 million more than the £28 million of the 1980 budget).

ELECTRICITY RATES INCREASED BY CEA

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

Agricultural exports reached £51 million last year, nearly 21 % higher than in 1978, says the annual report of the Ministry of Agriculture. They represented 40 % of total domestic exports.

The report describes 1979 as "quite a satisfactory agricultural year". Total Gross Agricultural Production reached £99.3m, a 17.7 % increase over 1978.

Both quantity and quality of crop yields were satisfactory. Total potato yields amounted to 170,000 tons (up 17.2 %), grape production reached 200,000 tons (up 11 %) and the citrus crop reached 100,000 tons (10.3 % increase). The olive crop at 10,500 tons was about the same as in 1978.

Meat

Animal production was also higher. Meat production reached 32,400 tons (up 5.2 %) while milk production reached 65,000 tons.

The report says the dairy and cattle population reached 32,000 heads (nearly an 11 % increase). The sheep and goat population stood at 515,000 and there were 2.2 million chickens, but pig population dropped by 9.6 % to 148,000 heads

due to the closure of small units in the pig industry.

Cyprus, meanwhile, imported a variety of agricultural products, both processed and unprocessed foodstuffs, seeds, animal feedings stuffs, tobacco and beverages to the value of £58.2 m. Fertiliser imports jumped from £1.8 m in 1978 to £3.8 m last year.

The Third Emergency Action Plan (1979-81) sets broader targets in the agricultural sector aiming at higher levels of production and productivity through a more intensive utilization of land and water, wider cultivation of genetically improved crops and raising of improved breeds of animals, expansion of grazing lands and better training of farmers, livestock keepers and fishermen.

Considerable funds are earmarked for irrigation projects, including £7 m. on the Asprokremnos dam in Paphos and £8.7 m. on the Pitsilia rural development project which includes a number of water works.

The report cites the Geological Survey Department, continuing its search for underground water, located large quantities in the region of Peristerona-Akaki and Orouda, west of Nicosia, to be used for providing additional water supplies to the capital.

UPSURGE IN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS REPORTED

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

Electricity rates in Cyprus go up by 9% as from tomorrow with the prospect of more increases in the near future.

In a paid advertisement in local newspapers, the Cyprus Electricity Authority claimed it had "no other choice" but to impose higher charges as from November 1, because of inflation and the need to repay loans it had contracted earlier.

It said an additional increase of 2% will come into force on June 1, 1981.

Contradiction

But this will not be all, apparently, the Authority served notice that more increases can be expected in view of anticipated higher prices for fuel oil.

Contradicting official assurances that the Gulf war has not affected oil supplies to the island, the Authority alleged that the Iran-Iraq conflict had pushed up the

PR Society to be formed

Mr Yiannis Lavedzis, chairman of the Public Relations Society of Greece, has spoken about "Communication, democracy and public relations" at a gathering at the Public Information Office organised by the Cyprus Arts and Communications Association.

It was announced at the end of the meeting that a Public Relations Society is to be formed in Cyprus also. PR officers in the government and various organisations, as well as people running PR offices, will be eligible to join.

price of liquid fuels in the island.

The EAC advertisement said the Authority paid 25% higher for a recent shipment of fuel oil (mazut) which is used by the Authority's power stations. The EAC usually gets such fuel supplies from the Soviet Union.

Chain reaction

"In view of the above, the EAC feels the need to warn consumers of the unavoidable increases that will be observed in their electricity bills", the statement added.

There have been warnings that such increases will push up the prices of most products manufactured in the island.

The Authority finally advised consumers to make "rational use" of electric power and avoid any waste.

PAPER SEES LONG-RANGE MOVE TO LEFT IN SOCIALIST PARTY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Nov 80 p 12

[Editorial]

[Text] Member of Folketing Robert Pedersen, who is a Social Democrat, has denied a report that he will vote against a zero solution for defense. But he has said that he could not vote for such an outcome of the deliberations. He has thus made it known that he does not agree with the policy pursued by the government and that he could not support it if it comes to a vote in Folketing. Robert Pedersen has shown that he belongs to what might be called the right wing of the Social Democratic Party. But is there such a wing? Is Robert Pedersen the only one in the Social Democratic parliamentary group who feels this way?

Prior to Per Haekkerup's death there was a clear line in the Social Democratic Party leading back to the position characterizing the Social Democrats in the postwar period. This position led Denmark into the Atlantic Treaty and it produced the broad unanimity in Folketing on defense. In the current situation K. B. Andersen has made it clear that he supports this position but his party comrades know that he will not be in Folketing after the next election and his words probably don't make much of an impression on them. And then there is Robert Pedersen, but are there others? The truth is that the Social Democratic group in Folketing and the government they have spawned demonstrate a crumbling of the former right-wing group so that the party leans to the left more than ever even on foreign policy and defense. The party is returning to its origins, forgetting its experiences from the thirties, the forties and the fifties.

Under Anker Jorgensen's leadership--or perhaps more precisely his lack of leadership--the Social Democrats are placing themselves in such a way that the balance point for the nation's foreign and defense policy is moving to the left on the political spectrum. It is as if the party is deliberately yielding to the efforts made by the communists, the Left-Socialists and the Socialist People's Party to undermine the previous policy and the re-emergence of the Radical Liberal Party in its historic position gives it an alibi for doing so. They are deliberately destroying the strong basis for the nation's security policy which since the war has been founded on an understanding and a cooperation among the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives.

The worst part of it is that this is not the result of an opportunistic attitude inspired by immediate political power conditions. The worst thing is that it seems to represent a very deliberate change of course.

REPORT SHOWS CIVIL DEFENSE SYSTEM INADEQUATE IN AREAS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 31 Oct 80 pp 3, 6

[Article by Rolf Bagger]

[Text] Recently the Civil Defense Agency released a memorandum on civil preparedness. It shows that in a number of areas Danish society has done little planning aimed at handling crises and catastrophes that could affect Denmark in the 1980's. But where planning is nonexistent this is clearly due to political decisions made in the 1970's.

Two weeks ago the Civil Defense Agency released two memos outlining what has been achieved within the areas of civil defense and civil preparedness. The second area refers to the preparations that will insure that society, its administration, transportation system, production and supplies can function in times of war, crisis or catastrophe.

The memo on civil preparedness stated that there are important gaps. These include safeguarding vital national production, supplies of raw materials and spare parts along with stockpiles of both industrial and agricultural products. It involves the so-called computer preparedness, e.g. the safeguarding and continuation or the destruction of the country's many computer files. It involves hygienic preparedness, e.g. safeguards against epidemics and pollution of food and drinking water by such things as radioactive fallout and chemicals. It involves medicinal preparedness, e.g. guarantees for the provision of drugs. And finally it involves planning and preparation of municipal tasks in all these areas in a war, crisis or catastrophe situation.

Of all the areas mentioned the published memorandum says that planning and decisions are either very incomplete or totally nonexistent. Only in one supply area are conditions described as reasonably satisfactory--the energy sector.

All this is very ironic. The present state of things is largely a result of the Danish society's political ability and determination or lack thereof to learn something from the 1973 oil crisis.

The first big oil crisis which began in October 1973 at the same time as the war in the Middle East struck a quite unprepared Denmark. It is true that the

Civil Preparedness Act dates from 1959 (during the Cold War) but interest in the work was fading as far back as 1965 and Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag was the first to give the work a lower priority by moving the civil preparedness secretariat from the Prime Minister's Office to the Internal Affairs Ministry.

The oil crisis forced the Danish Government and administration to improvise to a large extent. The lasting result is the emergency planning which through the emergency stockpiles law among others guarantees enough oil products to meet the country's needs for 3-4 months of normal consumption or for 9 months under rationing.

But as a result of savings efforts, based especially on the effects of the oil crisis, Hartling's narrow Liberal government actually downgraded emergency planning even further on the heels of the oil crisis. This happened on 1 June 1974 when the civil preparedness secretariat was moved from the Internal Affairs Ministry to the Civil Defense Agency which is not its natural home. At the same time personnel in the planning secretariat was cut from two leaders, four case workers and three office workers to three case workers and two office workers.

But the cuts did not merely express a desire to save money. Clearly they also expressed a desire on the part of Internal Affairs Minister Jacob Sorensen to downgrade the work to create provisions that would enable society to deal with such things as supply problems. In the Civil Defense Agency's annual report on work in the civil preparedness area in 1974 it says on page 2 in connection with the transfer of the secretariat from the ministry to the Civil Defense Agency: "It was indicated then that the area would continue to be administered at the same low activity level prevailing in recent years by the Civil Defense Agency."

Political Desire

This has been done. The results have been accordingly but in view of the fact that no later government or internal affairs minister has changed the level of activity this must be regarded as expressing a political desire. The annual report for 1975 says: "There are shortcomings in several important areas." The annual report for 1976 (which is classified as are subsequent reports) says: "The status of civil preparedness at the end of 1976 has not improved much in relation to the situation at the end of 1975." An identical statement is made in 1977. In 1978 it says that this status "has improved in only a few areas in relation to the situation at the end of 1977."

Terrorist acts and a freeze on delivery of raw materials are only two factors which have already expanded the classic concept of war readiness. In 1976 the Civil Defense Agency asked the Ministry of Trade to start planning concerned with maintaining the production of goods vital to society. Several ministries were asked to list their vital needs in various product groups. The recently issued memorandum says: "Some replies have been received and it is known that some ministries are continuing their deliberations."

Therefore there is no overall view today of how society would be affected by a freeze on deliveries of raw materials (especially metals) and spare parts to

Danish industry. The same thing applies to the agricultural sector. A halt in the importing of artificial fertilizer or raw materials for the Danish production of artificial fertilizer would almost immediately hit plant production very hard. An emergency supply of 330 tons of powdered milk for infants was phased out by the Hartling government in 1974 as a savings move. The vulnerability of our society is shown by the fact that the people in the capital would not be guaranteed the delivery of adequate food supplies if connections between eastern and western Denmark are disrupted.

In the area of hygienic readiness the memorandum says directly that as things are now "even minor spreading of poison and infectious material along with disruptions in water, sewer and garbage services could strike us hard."

This kind of thing can happen even in peacetime, as a result of catastrophes or sabotage against the chemical industry or other types of production, for example.

Civil preparedness is cheap. To a large extent all it takes is planning. The Civil Defense Agency has determined that to create the most necessary basic preparedness would take 30-35 case workers plus office personnel in the agency, in the ministries and regionally (on the county level). At a conference on these matters last week in which officials from a number of affected authorities and Internal Affairs Minister Henning Rasmussen took part it was stated without contradiction that we could accomplish a good deal if the ministries involved could only be made to take an interest in the matter.

At the moment in the entire public sector (agency, ministries and counties) only 13 case workers are employed to plan civil preparedness. In Norway there are 180 and in Sweden around 800 people are working on this job.

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CSO: 3106

GREENLAND TO ASSUME ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TASK

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 23 Oct 80 p 9

[Text] Double shifts in job training institutions are being considered to handle the flood of job training applicants.

Starting 1 January 1981 the Greenland home rule will take over three areas of training, namely job training, educational subsidies and vocational guidance. At the same time child care education will be switched back to the vocational education sector. But teacher training at the Greenland seminary will continue to come under the Directorate for Cultural Affairs.

A vocational education council of eight members will be set up, three appointed by the national assembly and the rest by organizations representing labor market groups. The chairman of the council will be director of the vocational sector. The council will advise the administration on vocational matters.

Section in Denmark

Educational subsidies will be granted but only to education that can be used or could be used in Greenland. The subsidies cover training in both Greenland and Denmark. The only exceptions are elementary and secondary school students.

Educational subsidies will have a separate administration under the Vocational Training Inspectorate.

As far as possible education should be acquired in Greenland. But education in Denmark cannot be ignored. Therefore there will also be a need for an education section at the Home Office in Denmark. But the section will be run from Greenland.

Efforts are being made to educate the large classes of young people without increasing the use of resources to an unreasonable extent. Untraditional methods could be used, such as having double shifts at vocational training institutions, giving job introduction courses and providing social service jobs.

Advice

Age Hammeken, spokesman for the Siumut ["Forward"] group, expressed pleasure that vocational training would be better organized and more society oriented.

But Atassut ["Mutual Cooperation"] was dissatisfied that the administration member in charge of vocational affairs would be given too much authority. He would be more bound by the decisions of the council if he acted as its chairman. Atassut asked if administration members are to have the same authority as ministers. The party also objected to shifting child care training courses to the area of vocational training.

The administration member in charge of vocational affairs, Lars Emil Johansen, replied that an administration member under the Home Rule Act is responsible to the national assembly and cannot work as he sees fit. The vocational training council will be advisory for the administration member for the vocational sector and it would not be very smart of him to advise himself.

The first debate ended with referring the national assembly's statutory proposal to a committee appointed at the request of Atassut.

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CSO: 3106

OFFICIAL REPORT SHOWS INDUSTRY LAYS OFF 75 EACH DAY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Nov 80 p 9]

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] Danish industry is busily reducing production and its need for labor is also declining dramatically.

Against the background of a just published "market barometer" for industry released by the Danish Bureau of Statistics economists from the Industrial Council estimate that employment in industry alone will decline by about 10,000 jobs in the last 6 months of the year. This amounts to 75 fewer industrial workers and employees every single working day in this period of time.

Industrial economist Verner Puggaard told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the new "market barometer" for industry fully confirms the latest gloomy forecast for developments from the Industrial Council.

"From the second to the third quarter industrial production in terms of quantity declined 1 1/2 percent and in the fourth quarter of 1980 we expect a further production decline of the same magnitude. Orders have declined sharply and are now obviously below the normal level in many firms. Orders from the Danish domestic market have fallen off most but the new figures show that foreign orders are now starting to decline as well."

No Bright Points

There are absolutely no bright points in the new industrial "market barometer" which is based on the evaluations of 650 of the biggest industrial firms in the country. There is decline and depression all the way down the line.

Both production and employment declined from the second to the third quarter and in the opinion of industrial directors this tendency will continue in the fourth quarter. A sharp nonseasonal decline in employment is expected here. A continued reduction in orders is also expected during the fourth quarter and investment plans are being curtailed.

On 1 October fully productive machines were not operating in 33 percent of all industrial firms and the main reason was lack of sales opportunities for the

products of these firms. Only 6 percent of the firms now say they have trouble acquiring the labor they need--a figure called very low by the economists of the Industrial Council.

Big Inventories

The only thing increasing in industry at the moment is the size of inventories.

The inventories of both finished goods and raw materials are clearly higher than normal according to the figures in the "market barometer" and these large inventories are the reason for declining imports from abroad in recent months. Industry is halting its imports of raw materials until inventories have been reduced to a more normal level again.

The new figures from the Danish Bureau of Statistics show that all sectors of industry are now affected by the depression: consumer products industries, investment products industries and construction materials industries.

In all branches of industry estimates of production and employment indicate a clearly downward trend and the situation is so serious that we have to go back to 1974-75--after the first oil crisis--to find a comparable depressive situation.

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CSO: 3106

OIL NATIONALIZATION, DEFENSE ISSUES AND SDP RISE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Solveig Rodgaard]

[Text] Political Index

Questions: Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow?

Replies were collected between 4 and 17 October 1980. All answers shown in percentages.

	23 Oct 1979	Apr 1980	May 1980	June 1980	Aug 1980	Sept 1980	Oct 1980
Social Democrats	36.3	35.9	37.4	35.3	36.6	36.7	37.9
Radical Liberals	5.4	5.1	5.6	4.6	4.8	5.9	5.6
Conservatives	12.5	13.5	14.2	14.7	13.8	15.0	14.0
Single-Tax Party	2.6	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.7	3.2
Socialist People's Party	5.9	6.5	7.6	7.6	6.2	5.8	6.3
Communist Party	1.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
Center-Democrats	3.2	--	--	2.6	--	2.2	2.4
Christian People's Party	2.6	2.9	2.0	2.4	2.3	3.7	2.6
Communist Workers	0.4	--	--	--	--	--	--
Liberals	12.5	13.4	12.8	13.3	13.4	11.8	12.2
Left-Socialists	3.7	3.5	4.4	4.1	3.4	4.3	3.0
Progressives	11.0	11.3	10.6	10.9	11.5	9.6	10.5
Other parties*	--	3.8	3.4	2.1	3.6	2.3	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Parties with less than 2 percent

Reproduction permitted if Gallup Institute and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE are cited as sources.

North Sea Oil and Defense Attitudes Benefit Social Democrats

In spite of the many attacks on the government for its attitude on defense issues and in negotiations on North Sea oil the Social Democrats have received increased voter support. But the party still has not regained the support it had prior to the election 1 year ago.

This is shown by the Gallup poll made around the time Folketing opened and several weeks afterward. But voter enthusiasm is less noticeable among the government's compromise parties. Compared with the last Gallup poll the Radical Liberals declined somewhat and the Christian People's Party declined quite a bit. The Center-Democrats advanced from 2.2 to 2.6 percent but they are still the smallest compromise party.

The Conservatives declined from 15 to 14 percent of voter support but according to the Gallup survey this is still the second largest party in Folketing.

It is worth noting that the Left-Socialists declined and are now below the election figures. The party has had good voter support ever since the election. The decline occurred at the same time when seven members left the party saying that it had slid too much to the right.

Seats

On the basis of the Gallup figures BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has estimated the distribution of the 175 parliamentary seats that are elected in Denmark. No party distribution has been made for the two constitutionally-determined seats from the Faeroe Islands and the two from Greenland.

	Today	Gallup
Social Democrats	68	68
Radical Liberals	10	10
Conservatives	22	25
Single-Tax Party	3	6
Soc. People's Party	11	11
Center-Democrats	6	4
Christ. People's Party	3	3
Liberals	22	22
Left-Socialists	6	3
Progressives	20	19

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CSO: 1106

ECONOMY MINISTER: PLAN TO GET FORCED LOANS ABANDONED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Christian Brondum]

[Text] The government will now investigate whether there are other possibilities for obtaining risk capital for business at a low interest rate besides taking it from the big funds held by pension groups and life insurance companies.

Economy Minister Ivar Norgaard said this after having announced yesterday that he now regards the government's "offer" to pension funds and life insurance companies to have expired. The announcement was made after the companies told the government they did not wish to cooperate with the proposed arrangement.

Ivar Norgaard told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE he would recommend to the government's Economic Committee on Tuesday that the government have a committee analyze the entire capital market situation. Ivar Norgaard will also look into a proposal to change the rules concerning where pension funds and life insurance companies can put their money. The chairman of the Savings Banks Association, director Laurits Ringgaard, suggested in BORSEN that legislative changes make it possible for companies to invest their money in a wider range of business activities.

"We will look at the proposal but I don't think there is really much to it."

Conservative Party chairman and member of Folketing Ib Stetter said yesterday that if the government withdraws its proposal on compulsory capital transfers and if this means that there will be no special taxation of these savings funds the Conservatives will withdraw their inquiry to the government on this matter. This was planned for 12 November.

Ivar Norgaard said in a comment on this that he at no time had plans to tax pension funds and life insurance companies if they turned down the government's offer.

6574

CSO: 3106

PLO SEEKS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN HELSINKI

LD201934 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 20 Nov 80

[Summary] The PLO has proposed the opening of a diplomatic mission in Helsinki. According to the Foreign Ministry the PLO may open an information office in Helsinki but as for the opening of a diplomatic mission Finland will abide by its present stand, recognizing only states, not governments or liberation movements. Hannu Reine reports:

"In the past year the question of diplomatic recognition of the PLO has come to the fore in the Finnish political debate, which otherwise very rarely touches on foreign policy. The Arab Nations' Friendship Society, founded a few years ago, has aimed at increasing public interest in the Middle East, and particularly the Palestinian issue by putting forward the PLO's view in this extremely complicated problem. A delegation led by the society's chairman, Social Democrat Diet Deputy Tellervo Koivisto, visited the PLO headquarters in Beirut this year, meeting among others the organization's chairman Yasser 'Arafat. Now the director of the PLO's mission in Moscow, Muhammad al-Sha'ir, has been the guest of the Arab Nations' Friendship Society in Finland. Dr Sha'ir has been the PLO representative in Moscow ever since the Soviet Union extended diplomatic recognition to the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people 5 years ago."

The central aim of PLO's diplomacy is to obtain recognition from as many states as possible.

"Thus Dr Sha'ir who yesterday met officials from the Foreign Ministry as well as Foreign Minister Vayrynen, proposed to Finland the opening of a PLO diplomatic mission in Helsinki:

[Begin recording Sha'ir, in English fading into Finnish translation] "I proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of a political mission of the PLO in Helsinki, says Dr Sha'ir, who stresses that it would be specifically a political mission, not an information bureau which the PLO already has in Stockholm, Paris and London among other places. What was the Finnish reply to the PLO's proposal?

In all respects I noted that the Finns have given positive answers, but they will discuss the matter on a higher level to give a final answer. Dr Sha'ir says that the PLO's endeavor may be fruitful. If Finland rejects our proposal,

however, we hold the view all the same that the position of Palestinians in your country is not weak among the political parties and public opinion, who widely understand the Palestinians' right to their homeland, says the PLO representative, Dr. Sha'ir. [end recording]

"There has not yet been time to comment on the PLO's proposal to Finland on a political level. The Foreign Ministry points out, for its part, that it reiterated to the PLO representative the view that Finland has already put forward, according to which there are no obstacles to the opening of a PLO information bureau in Helsinki. On the other hand, Finland recognizes only states, not governments and so has diplomatic relations only with states, not governments or liberation movements, says the Foreign Ministry about the PLO's proposal."

During his visit Dr. Sha'ir also met representatives of the political parties, whose views will probably be heard soon.

CSO: 3107

OFFICIALS DEDICATE LARGE UNDERGROUND CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTER

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Thure Malmberg: "100,000 Commuters Without Shelter in Helsinki"]

[Text] The first great civil defense exercise in Uusimaa began on Monday when Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi of Helsinki and the city officials of the Uusimaa coastal cities together with a personnel of close to 450 persons went underground for a week of intensive training. This is the first time an exercise of this size has been held in a bilingual county. With this in mind the directive of the internal affairs ministry was prepared in two languages, and in the leading group under Observatory Hill in Helsinki communications between the main center in Tampere and the municipal centers in, for example, Ekenaes, are monitored for the purpose of preventing possible language difficulties.

1,500 Howling Sirens

Today at 1200 hours people all over the country will hear of the exercise, for at that time 1,500 sirens will howl all over Finland.

In Helsinki alone, 63 electrical sirens and 10 high effect are in operation. In addition, 40 sirens are held in reserve for wartime.

Nevertheless, Helsinki is not quite convinced that the alarm will be heard sufficiently well everywhere: at its latest meeting the fire board put a secret stamp on the whole question of sirens. Everything indicates that more are needed. Moreover, this problem does not apply to Helsinki alone: during the 1978 test it appeared, among other things, that the sirens were not heard all over Sibbo and Perna, for example.

Cost of Exercise 230,000 Marks

Uusimaa is now the exercise area, but certain other parts of the country are coupled in. In addition to the municipal leading groups, 14 industries and installations are participating. In direct cash payments the exercise will cost 230,000 marks, without counting the service contributed by Raimo Ilaskivi and other municipal heads, presumably well paid.

Provincial Governor Kaarlo Pitkanen asserted during a brief situation review under Observatory Hill on Monday that the purpose of the exercise was both that of

handling the county administration's ordinary tasks while working underground, and training for wartime efforts.

"The risk of war is obvious, and this risk should not be dealt with lightly. Protection of the people is a concrete question that must be taken care of," he said, "But thus far the municipal leaderships' powers are only assumed, not established in law."

Commuters Without Shelters

Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi asserted that preparedness in Helsinki is quite good, with shelters having been constructed for four-fifths of the city's inhabitants.

"When the shelters in the subway stations can in the near future also be put to use the situation will be quite satisfactory.

"On the other hand, Helsinki has no shelters for the about 100,000 commuters who work everyday in our city. Nor can the inner city accommodate the whole work force found there during working hours--no matter how much they are Helsinki inhabitants.

"If all commuters had to be accommodated in shelters, some would definitely find no room," said the Mayor.

"Helsinki has three other problems that concern the protection of the people:

Helsinki: A Border City

"Can the alarm be given with adequate effect, for example? Helsinki is a border city and this gives very little time for seeking shelter."

"And Helsinki is also under Finnish conditions a large city, with sensitive water and electrical supplies. Supply interruptions quickly affect the population, and this is something we shall examine during the exercise.

"A fourth problem is that of warning the people punctually. The county government has via radio opportunities for direct contact with the population, while the city of Helsinki has no such direct ether channel to the inhabitants. In Helsinki, preparedness is better on paper than it is in practice," said Mayor Ilaskivi."

Among other things, the effectiveness of the sirens will be precisely evaluated after today's exercise. Concerning other questions as well, the results of this exercise, the preparation for which took 6 months, will be closely studied in Helsinki.

Invasion at Hangoe

This is exclusively a civilian exercise, but it will involve a military feature: a landing will be simulated, beginning in western Usimaa today.

At large situation maps under Observatory Hill secretaries of the county government stand ready to launch invasion craft at the coast from Hangoe to Ekenaes.

Helsinki Bombed

At the same time, radioactive materials escape at Haestholmen, and to make the situation even worse in eastern Uusima, chemical dangers are simulated, either from the Skeeldvik industries or from one of the many trains carrying poisons through, for example, Sibbo. At the same time, Helsinki is fired upon by the guns of invasion vessels and is bombed.

Among the ingredients of the exercise are also epidemics and chemical warfare, something a team of physicians work to limit during all five days of the exercise.

Leader of the exercise is section chief Pekka Myllyniemi, of the lifesaving section of the interior ministry.

"The exercise is part of the total defense effort. Each year, we try to hold an exercise in some county. This is the first time a bilingual county is involved.

"Today we have shelters for 2.1 million people in Finland. Most people are therefore obliged to resort to temporary shelters, and nobody knows how much time he has," he points out.

Underground Communities

Under Observatory Hill and in other shelters in Helsinki about 110 persons from the county government and an equal number from the city of Helsinki, headed by the Mayor, are this week at work.

Similarly, the municipal leading groups, headed by the city directors, have gone underground in Lovisa, Borga, Kervi, Esbo, Vanda, Grankulla, Loja, and Ekenaes. These groups are keeping in contact with the various municipalities.

When the general alarm sounds today at 1200 hours, everybody will according to the instructions go indoors, close windows and doors, and listen to the radio for detailed instructions. Immediately thereupon, the announcer, among others, of the weekly news in Swedish will state that it is a matter of an exercise.

Since Ekenaes is this time the most Swedish of the municipal leadership groups there is hardly reason to anticipate too great language problems, in particular because on the Swedish-speaking side people will be picked for key positions who master Finnish.

How To Warn Aaland?

How Aaland would be warned in a real crisis situation is another matter. For example: none of the experts present knew whether the personnel at the alarm center in Tampere knows Swedish.

How a crisis alarm is to reach Aaland quickly seemed unclear, at least on Monday when HUFVUDSTADSBLADET tried various ways--in Swedish.

Goran Holmberg, the city population chief of Mariehamn, was out of town; Sven-Olaf Roman, life-saving chief, was off duty; office chief Gunnar Jansson of the municipal

council referred us to the provincial council, where the functionary concerned was on leave. Finally, Governor Martin Isaksson informed us that Fire Inspector Hans Enberg was the man to contact, and he had gone out. No telephone exchange operators had instructions concerning alarm situations. At the city hall it was thought that there was a shelter available in the basement.

"We have not practiced communication with the national alarm center in Tampere, but when Mariehamn by and by gets its own alarm center, things will be better," said Governor Isaksson.

11,256

CSO: 3109

WARTSILA TO CONSTRUCT SOVIET NUCLEAR ICEBREAKER

LD132058 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 13 Nov 80

[Text] One of the most interesting targets of Finnish-Soviet production cooperation is the designing and building of a nuclear-powered icebreaker, which, according to the director general of the Wartsila concern, Minister Tankmar Horn, it is hoped to include in the next 5-year basic agreement between our countries. Juhani Ikonen reports:

If the nuclear icebreaker is included in the next Finnish-Soviet 5-year basic agreement this would mean, according to Minister Horn, that the vessel would most probably be delivered to the Soviet Union at the end of 1985. Horn says that the discussions are still at such an initial stage that Wartsila does not yet know how big a vessel will be considered in the end. In any case the intention is that Wartsila is to build the vessel at its Helsinki shipyard. From there the icebreaker will be towed to Leningrad where the installation of the nuclear reactor will take place.

The building of a nuclear icebreaker is connected with Soviet programs aimed at the utilization of the plentiful natural resources of the Arctic areas. Finnish industry has in general been interested in having a share in the implementation of these programs. Minister Horn said that the designing and building of the nuclear icebreaker would be an interesting challenge to the enterprise he directs. Horn was not yet able to give any exact estimates about the financial value of the icebreaker project, but it is quite clear that the sums involved will be considerable, for even a Baltic icebreaker, equipped with conventional engines, is an investment of hundreds of millions of markka.

Apart from the icebreaker, the long-term program signed in Moscow yesterday refers also more generally to the fact that possibilities are opening for the Finns for an increasingly extensive participation in the implementation of the programs for the utilization of the above-mentioned natural resources.

CSO: 3107

CHANGES, DEFECTIONS, INTERNAL DISSENT IN PCF MEMBERSHIP

PCF Cleans House

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Edmond Bergheaud: "The PCF 'Cleans House' -- Expulsions for 'Crime of Lese-Marchais'"]

[Text] The Communist Party [PCF] "cleans house." But as Georges Marchais has stated on several occasions "that there will be no expulsions," at least not decided on by the ruling authorities, this matter is left up to the sections and the federations. Thus, it would be possible to state that certain militants, having proven themselves to be inconvenient, have been rejected according to the expressed wishes of the rank and file. This is actually an ancient tactic: in 1952, Charles Tillon was expelled by the federation of the Bouches-du-Rhone. But this decision was never ratified by the Central Committee. This allows the party leadership to pretend that those who had joined the PCF in 1922, who had never betrayed communism as such, but who had criticized Soviet policy and the French leaders, had not been driven out.

The dispute within the PCF, which has been going on for months and months, had led Georges Marchais and his comrades to take precautions. Thus, the new statutes adopted by the XXIII congress (1979) provided for two possible ways available to those who want to regain a certain form of freedom. When a communist decides to "hand in his resignation," this is "registered by the cell." But another article specifies the sanctions which may be imposed on a member who is guilty of "deliberate violation of the statutes or of party policy": a reprimand, a withdrawal of responsibilities or expulsion. In principle, these measures are submitted for ratification by the section committee or the federal committee. Expulsion, however, is submitted for ratification by the Central Committee.

Thus, it is the Central Committee which will have to reach a verdict on the latest affair to date. As a matter of fact, the federal committee of Paris has expelled Henri Fiszbin, Eddy Kenig and Louis Regulier from its ranks.

A Letter Too Much

It is true that, like his comrades, Henri Fiszbin -- who at one time was secretary of the powerful Paris federation --, had protested against the manner in which the communist candidate for the 1981 presidential election had been selected. In a

letter, addressed to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the PCF, the "rebel" had notably written: "It seems to me that the direction the party is being urged into involves extremely grave consequences. This orientation does not correspond to the needs of the struggle for real change. It was decided on without being first submitted to the party for discussion." Henri Fiszbin had asked to be allowed to present his point of view before the national conference, which met on 11 and 12 October. He met with a blunt refusal. Because Georges Marchais had to be supported without either hesitation or grumbling.

Like his comrades, the former secretary of the Paris federation had drawn his conclusions from it: he would not become involved in the electoral campaign in favor of the secretary general.

Thus, the "Parisian rebels" are joining another communist militant, Jean Kehayan, in disgrace. His "crime" was to have written, together with his wife, "The Street of the Red Proletarian," an irrefutable document on the living conditions of the average Soviet citizen. Now, Jean Kehayan did not judge the USSR as an anticommunist, but rather as a communist who believes that socialism does not exist in the Soviet Union. The author committed a second offense with "Piotr's Footstool." Now, this book had not yet become available in the bookstores when the federal committee of the Bouches-du-Rhone expelled the iconoclast, who had worsened his case by making a recommendation against voting for Marchais.

If Henri Fiszbin primarily criticizes the manner in which internal democracy is practiced within the PCF, Jean Kehayan, on the other hand, has called into question the model that Moscow must remain for all communists. Now, the ties between the PCF and the USSR have been remarkably strengthened. If there is a crime of lese-Marchais, there is also a crime of lese-Brezhnev.

Such an expulsion by the PCF had already been practiced with regard to Jean Elleinstein, who, "having no longer anything in common" with the party, had been driven out of his cell in the XII arrondissement of Paris, on 24 October. It is true that this communist historian had advocated the development of another PCF, capable of standing aloof from Moscow. Jean Elleinstein had tied two phenomena together: the break-up of the union of the left and the rapprochement with the Soviets, the second policy explaining the first. But, in the eyes of certain militants, the leadership's ukases are not accepted without flinching. While the federal committee approved the expulsion of Jean Elleinstein, there were, however, 12 abstentions (out of 80 present).

But these protesters -- who have to ascertain their influence on those who, in the face of all opposition, remain loyal to the Marchais line -- must answer the following major question, the only one even: "Is it possible to conceive a socialism freed from the weight of Soviet imperatives?"

Deputy Mayor Resigns

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 80 p 11

Articles: "Le Carcassonnais: Deputy Mayor Leaves PCF"

Text: On Wednesday, 27 October, Mr Marcel Peytavi, second deputy in the (socialist) mayor of Carcassonne, turned in his resignation from the Communist Party. In a letter, which he addressed to the federal committee of the PCF, Mr Peytavi noted that "it is a personal decision, resulting from profound disagreements with the national policy of the party." He believes that the formula of the "overall positive balance of the socialist countries" leads to "a minimizing of the lack of democracy" in those countries. Moreover, he specified that he "cannot resign himself to the disunity of the left" and "to the open war which exists between the Communist and Socialist Parties." Finally, Mr Peytavi added that he could not approve of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

A member of the town committee of Carcassonne and of the Communist Party's federal committee of the department of Aude, which he joined in 1960, Mr Peytavi was president of the communist group in the municipal council.

Protest of Kehayan's Expulsion

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Oct 80 p 62

Articles: "Marseillais Communists Protest Against the Expulsion of Mr Kehayan"

Text: On Tuesday, 28 October, four Marseillais communists -- Mr Jerome Freydier, Mrs Renique Lenee, and Messrs Jean-Jose Mesguen and Michel Roux -- published a statement protesting against the expulsion of Mr Jean Kehayan, which had been decided on by the federal committee of the PCF of the Bouches-du-Rhone.

These militants recalled that, according to the PCF statutes, "any militant liable to punishment, must be informed of the charges which have been formulated against him and be heard by the assembly of his organization," which has not been the case for Mr Kehayan. They also recalled that on 4 June 1978, Mr Georges Marchais had stated: "We do not want to expel anyone (...) because it is not our idea to respond to a political problem with administrative measures."

They declared: "The apparent change which seems to be implied by this return of expulsion is based, in fact, on a fundamentally unchanged attitude: the refusal of an internal democratic life... about the major questions relating to life of the party. Whether one or another intellectual is allowed to express himself as he wants to act, whether one or another other militant is punished and expelled, in any case there is no debate within the party. (...)"

"Whether it is at a time of liberal smiles or at a time of sectarian tensions, we will defend the right to criticize the party's position /by all the members/ (in Italy), the right /for all the members/ (in Italy), to settle the debate, including by means of expulsion. This is why, as long as the party leadership reserves for itself the right of expulsion without discussion, we will stand up for those whom we will not have been able to fight in a real communist debate."

Interview With Former Member

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 May 80 p 10

Report an interview with Mr Alexandre Adler, historian and former member of the PCF, published in CRITIQUE COMMUNISTE: "The Strategic Turning Point of the PCF"; name of interviewer, date and place of interview not given

[Text] In its October issue*, CRITIQUE COMMUNISTE, the theoretical journal of the Revolutionary Communist League, published a long interview with Mr Alexandre Adler, a historian and one of the authors of "The USSR and Us" (a work which was approved by the political bureau of the PCF in September 1978), who left the Communist Party last February. The analysis set out by Mr Adler during that interview is particularly enlightening with regard to the recent evolution of the PCF, its functioning and its tendencies in relation to the salient events of the last 10 years, on the one hand, and certain traditional characteristics of the workers movement, on the other hand.**

Mr Adler explained that the preparations for the 23rd Congress of the PCF (May 1979) and its current results, represents a turning point with regard to "Waldeck Rochet's strategy, which was the strategy of Champigny." According to Mr Adler, "the real political debate which took place within the party leadership" in the early sixties, opposed "a perspective of long term historical compromise to Gaullism" and "the alternative of the left, that is to say the rebuilding of a union of the left with the socialists, who were being helped in their recovery." This second perspective, which was advocated by Mr Waldeck Rochet, won, noted Mr Adler, thanks to the arbitration of a third group, "incapable of giving the party a real orientation, but always in a position to prohibit it from moving in certain directions." The influence of this group, characterized by a "mixture of anarcho-unionism and of unconditional pro-Sovietism," has hindered the "Waldeckian renewal."

"This party which limped, with one leg forward -- the union -- and one leg still stiff -- the relationships with the Soviets, the internal organization of the party (...) --, of course found itself in an unbalanced position, from the day that the common program gave a certain vigor back to the Socialist Party," stated Mr Adler. The modernization of the 22d Congress, in February 1976, came too late "in a period of competition with the Socialist Party" which was started with the 21st congress in October 1974. This 21st Congress "was to have been (...) the definitive achievement" of the perspective drawn up, in September 1968, by the Champigny manifesto, but "the proletarian tendency which took over that congress (...) invalidated its main conclusions, and then began an extremely vigorous offensive against the Socialist Party, parallel to the development of the political crisis in Portugal during the winter of 1975." This tendency led to criticism of the common program in 1979, and today to the rejection of the union with the PS [Socialist Party] "as it is."

* CRITIQUE COMMUNISTE, No 33, 12F, 9, rue de Paris, 75011 Paris.

** Mr Adler is also, together with Mr Jean Bony, the author of "The International and the Women's Side" (published by Mazarine), a book which LE MONDE will review shortly.

Mr. Alier characterized this tendency as a "profound anarcho-unionism, (which) consists of admitting that the working class is not the leading class, that the working class should not burden itself with the state, because each time it participates the slightest bit in the state, this action becomes a trap which closes on it." This tendency is led by "people who are not anarcho-unionists in the traditional sense, but who have kept a certain comintern or cominformist mentality, that is to say who consider that relations with the Soviet Union are fundamental, that we are living in a world revolution, that the solidarity among revolutionary parties is, after all, infinitely more important than the small day to day arrangements with the Socialist Party."

Mr. Alier stated that: "there are thousands of communist militants who have decided to oppose the current course, which the leaders have imposed without any real discussion." To conclude, he outlined the perspective of a "restructuring of the forces of the left and (of) the creation of an alternative to the power of the capitalists, which must be located at the European level."

Marchais Loses More Support

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Nov 80 p 11.

Article: "We Will Not Vote for the Candidate of the PCF Leaders, wrote Two Former Reporters of L'HUMANITE"

Text On Monday, 3 November, Messrs Pierre Li, former correspondent of L'HUMANITE for Warsaw, and Jean Weber, former deputy chief of the "Society" department of the PCF daily, published an article in LIBERATION, in which they indicated that they would not vote for Georges Marchais in the presidential election. They noted that: "Mr. Marchais had been 'designated (...) as candidate for the Elysee, without any political debate by the whole party," and that the "dissident voices" had been set aside prior to the national conference of 11 and 12 October.

Messrs Li and Weber believe that the current policy of the PCF ensures the realization of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing with, as a result, "even more crises, unemployment, and inflation." They wrote: "To be convinced that the PCF is taking the wrong road and not to say so, after having spent several years at L'HUMANITE, does not seem possible for us. However complex it may be, the policy of union is the only one which does not freeze the future. But the leaders of the PCF have replaced an inordinate love for the PC with suspicion and then hatred. The abandonment of the union forecloses the world. It is in order to refuse the worst that, for the first time, we will not cast our voice for the candidate of the Communist Party leadership."

Opposition Movement Strengthens

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Nov 80 p 2.

Article: "7 Candidates - 5 Voted - PCF: A New Period of Isolation"

Summary: "To make any legitimate protest, the communist leadership seems to have decided that it will no longer accept public criticism."

Since 1970, the Communist Party had not expelled any of its members. For several months, in spite of publicly expressed criticism, it did not impose any sanctions. And then, suddenly, in quick succession, the communist leaders decided to react. This has occurred in a scattered fashion, with a few inconsistencies, but in a non-vergent manner. Two reasons could explain this new attitude of the PCF leadership: the fear of an expansion of the movement which is critical of its current orientations, and the desire to complete the setting aside of those who, through their staff or elected position, express their sense of loss concerning the construction of the union of the left.

Over a period of a few days, the blade fell on the original communists. On 18 October, the Federal Bureau of Paris condemned and judged "intolerable" the public stand taken by five Paris councillors, which had been made public 3 days before. In it, Henri Flabiau, Francois Durand, Michel Ferignac, Jean Gajer and Jean-Jacques Rosta expressed their hostility towards the orientations of the presidential campaign, which were developed during the national conference of the PCF on 11 and 12 October.

The convergence of these offensives can be easily explained by reasons of opportunity. In the person of Jean Kehayan, and to a lesser degree in Jean Elieinstein, the leaders of the PCF found a golden pretext to apply their policy of firmness more widely. The first of these two calls for not voting for Georges Marchais, the second participates in a publication of the right -- LE FIGARO MAGAZINE. The one is expelled, they may be getting ready to do the same thing quietly to the other. Being certain that these two men, in taking positions which are difficult to understand by a communist militant, will find only weak support among their communist comrades.

As a policy of association is practiced, by penalising communists who express criticism of another nature. For them, it is neither a question of "tampering" the election campaign of the PCF nor of fighting it, even less of weakening it. But simply saying that they disagree with the current orientations of their party and that they will not "become involved personally in the battle of the presidential election."

In gratifying its ambitions, the Communist Party took these differences into account. And yet, the reprisal measures are not without contradictions. The Parisian communists spoke up publicly, and that is what they are being criticized for. All of them except for one, Louis Regulier. When the federal committee met on Monday, it had anticipated penalising only two men, Henri Flabiau and Edy Kenig. It was during the discussion that Louis Regulier declared himself in agreement with his two comrades. He was also expelled.

The 12 individuals who came out against this measure were not expelled. A novel and ambiguous method was used against Jean Elieinstein. As for the five councillors of Paris, they were rebuked in very strong language, which was not however followed by concrete effects. These differences in treatment reveal the Communist Party's hesitations about its response, as if it were testing the field while letting confusion reign over a Parisian federation which has been very much disrupted and shaken since 1974.

The question remains as to why the Communist Party has broken henceforth no longer to other criticism. Aside from the fact that this decision corresponds to an

ideologically tough political line and to an attitude of turning in on itself, there may be two reasons. While Jean Kehayan's position is too extreme to produce many followers, that of Henri Fiszbin and his comrades could find an echo within the party.

Thus, Antoine Spire, former official of EDITIONS SOCIALES, stated yesterday that "the movement of opposition to the sectarian and anti-unitarian line" of the PCF is strong. On the other hand, the communists at the University of Vincennes yesterday adopted a resolution intended to "inform their party of the profound distress caused by the direction taken by the election campaign" of Georges Marchais.

Are the PCF leaders afraid of contagion? Since 1978, the date to which the change in orientation of the PCF goes back, the party's cadres have been, to a greater or lesser extent, replaced. But there are still men who, in accordance with the policy of the union of the left, were elected to positions of responsibility, such as, for example, in local governments. For these men, the recent sanctions applied in Paris should serve as a warning.

And 3

CSO: 3100

PFN CANDIDATE GAUCHON OUTLINES ELECTION PROGRAM

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Oct 80 p 8

[Article: "Pascal Gauchon Defines His Program"--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Mr Pascal Gauchon, Presidential candidate of the Party of New Forces (PFN, extreme right) defined the electoral program he will defend during his campaign in the name of the "new political right" that he hopes to represent. This 13 points manifesto proposes mainly:

--/Freedoms: /"The adoption of fully proportional vote, the development of direct democracy by more frequent recourse to the referendum,/ elimination of the state monopoly in matters of radio and television, control of party finances."

--/Education: /"return to the merit principle complemented by a true equality of opportunities and by modernization of teaching"/ (return to grade level classes, elimination of the student card, protection of non-state education, etc).

--/Security forces:/ development of a elite police corps, acceleration of the judicial process, strict enforcement of given sentences, retaining of the death penalty.

--/Family:/ limitation of the abortion law, establishment of a maternal wage, generalization of accession to property.

--/Energy:/ regging of prices according to oil prices of goods and services furnished to OPEC countries, acceleration of the French nuclear program.

--/Inflation:/ reform of the European monetary system, the creation of a central European bank, a /more energetic/ policy towards OPEC countries.

--/Unemployment:/ protection of French industry /"by a European protectionism"/, a policy of reviving the economy, an easing of social and fiscal charges.

--/Agriculture:/ /development of a modern agriculture by the creation, with State assistance, of numerous schools, agronomy institutes and equipment cooperatives./

--/Immigration:/ /limiting the number of immigrants to 10 percent per community, denial of voting rights to immigrant workers./

--/Labor community:/ /"elimination of so-called representative trade unions and the possibility for all workers to participate in union elections at the first ballot"./

--/Defense:/ adoption of the neutron bomb, launching of new nuclear submarines, creation of a European intervention force, reinvigoration of the military function.

--/Foreign policy:/ independence of France vis-a-vis the blocs, support of South Africa, establishment of a Euro-African bloc /"against Soviet penetration"/ economic aid to the Third World, /boycott of terrorist states"./

--/Europe:/ creation of a European executive, entry in EEC open /to all free countries./

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CSO: 3100

GOVERNMENT OUTLAWS TERRORIST GROUP FANE; VIOLENT ACTS SUMMARIZED

Paris LE MATIN in French 4 Sep 80 p 24

[Article] "Extreme right: the government dissolves FANE (Federation for National and European Action)"

[Text] The government has decided that the activities of FANE are incompatible with the laws of 1936 and 1972 on the maintenance of public order. Those two laws provide for the dissolution by decree of private combat groups and militias. They define as such "all associations and de facto groups which could provoke armed demonstrations in the streets (. . .), which could provoke racial discrimination or incite hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons because of their origin or their belonging to an ethnic group, race or religion." The law of 1972, which complements the law of 1936, provides as a sanction: "Imprisonment for 1 month to 1 year and a fine of 2,000 to 300,000 francs." Acting in its own name as an accused party, FANE is the fourth extreme-right movement to be dissolved since 1958. The first was Jeune Nation, dissolved on 13 May 1958. After banning 11 extreme-left organizations on 12 June 1968, the Government ordered the dissolution of the extreme-right anti-communist Occident on 31 October of the same year. This anti-Marxist movement was known for its violent attacks on the French extreme left.

On 21 June 1973 it was the turn of Ordre Nouveau, dissolved at the same time as the Communist League, following a meeting of Ordre Nouveau in the Mutualite [translation unknown] to protest against immigration. Since May, 1968, 14 extreme-left movements have been dissolved as well as 4 movements of the extreme right. At the same time, five autonomist movements, two of them Corsican, 1 Basque and two Breton have also been struck down by decrees of dissolution.

At the headquarters of the Judiciary Police it was declared yesterday that the dissolution of such an association as FANE--an openly neo-Nazi organization-- was an administrative measure. Following the government decision, a police commissioner will soon visit the headquarters of the organization, which is governed by the law of 1901, to notify them of the decision in an oral declaration, explaining that the dissolution is in accordance with a dated and numbered decree. The police will not intervene except in the

case of a reconstitution, the creation of a new association involving the participation of the same officers, for example. It is known that the officers of FANE have taken the precaution of creating two new organizations.

"We Denounce the Enemies of White Culture"

A bundle of arrows on a circle which is itself surrounded by a square bearing an eagle: it is by this emblem that the unhappily famous FANE (Federation for National and European Action) is recognized. Its leader, Marc Fredricksen, a man of medium stature who smokes a pipe and shows off his gray suit in a 2 CV, has made many provocative declarations. Like this one: "The Jews during the last war? There were a few who died, a million at most. And many of them died of illness. . . . The gas chambers? Darquier de Pellepoix summed it up well: they didn't gas anything but lice."

In 1966 this bank employee, who is now 46 years old, reorganized two dissident branches of the Occident movement, Action Occidentale and the Charlemagne Circles and organized a new one, the above-named FANE. When, at the time of the legislative elections in 1977, he decided to fight the "reds" on their own ground in Seine-Saint-Denis, he was not entirely unknown among those who were homesick for Nazi barbarism.

However, it has in fact been only during these recent months that FANE, as a result of violent attacks, has begun to be spoken of by the columnists. Considering the large number of offenses committed in its name, it is difficult to judge which of them can really be put at FANE's door. FANE claimed credit for the attack made last 28 February on the Paris offices of the Soviet company Aeroflot. Also it was 15 of its bullies who on 15 June sacked the exposition on Nicaragua and El Salvador at the Marais in Paris before escaping with the cry of "Viva Nicaragua Fascista." Again it was they who on 25 June exploded a plastic bomb at the meeting place of the MRAP [Movement against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace], it was they again who perpetrated the attack on the Phenix bookstore on Sebastopol Boulevard, in Paris. It was definitely they who signed the threatening letter that 49 Jews recently received in Nice (see yesterday's MATIN and facing page). Most often, of course, FANE denies the authorship of its actions. At the same time, it is not out of the question that other groups of the extreme right, their ideological relationship not excluding competition, are trying to "hook" FANE by acting in its name.

It is still true that NOTRE EUROPE, FANE's newspaper, is always completely up to date with regard to the acts of violence committed by the extreme right and that above all it has been possible to wonder about the strange similarities between the methods, the explosives and the scenes of activity of groups like Delta (the murders of Henri Curiel and of Laid Sebai), like Peiper (nine assaults) or like Charles Martel (assaults against the

association of North African Students, against the Protestant Home at 46 Rue de Vaugirard in Paris) and those of FANE.

As for the insulting and threatening letter received by Rosette Curiel, the widow of Henri Curiel, before a molotov cocktail burned the doors of her apartment, didn't it carry the easily recognized emblem of that organization? Didn't one of the persons responsible for the racist aggressions at Bondy declare, after his arrest, that he was a member of FANE? In any case that organization has scrawled the vilest slogans, by which it may be judged, on the streets of Paris: "Yes to vivisection, let's use the Arabs as guinea pigs.", "Jews to the furnace," and other delicacies of the same kind. This means that those militants (60 in Paris and 200 in France (according to declarations by their leader), who parade in black shirts, riding breeches and wide belts, are not very observant of the rules of courtesy. When they meet, as they did at Roissy last January, in a huge "fascist council" including emissaries from several European national socialist movements, or as they did in the chateau of Poules-les-Echarmeaux (Rhône), it is to invoke memories of Hitler, Doriot and Rudolf Hess, whose freedom they have been demanding for a long time. It is also to celebrate the summer solstice and sing their fighting songs: "Members of the militia let's make France free of bolsheviks, freemasons, enemies/ Israel, base rotteness/ you are disgusting/ France vomits you . . .," or the Devil's Song: SS, we are marching to combat singing the Devil's Song," etc.

Their enemies, as always, are "the negroes, the Jews and the raccoons," because they are "national socialists, in other words we are against the enemies of white culture, which are the Semitic current and the massive invasion of other races who are leading us to a bastardization and degeneration of our civilization."

FANE has just been dissolved by the Council of ministers. The least that can be declared is that its members were expecting it. In number 22 of NOTRE EUROPE, Michel Laloup, alias Marc Fredricksen, addressed Christian Bonnet: "Do not spare the fascists. Carry out your repression thoroughly, because a few years from now the fascists will not spare you." However, the minister delayed too long as he studied their file, allowing FANE time to present two sister organizations to the Paris Prefecture of Police: the Nationalist European Fasces and the Center for European Culture. At the same address as FANE

There were plenty of reasons to justify the complaints made by MRAP and by the LICRA [International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism] for "justifying war crimes and inciting to racial hatred." The courts in Paris have therefore undertaken to track down Marc Fredricksen, who is responsible for the magazine NOTRE EUROPE. The trial will be held next 19 September.

Photo Caption

Marc Fredricksen, the leader of FANE, very happy about the publicity given to his movement.

12,116

CSO: 3100

MISSION, COMPLEMENT OF CREIL AIR BASE DESCRIBED

Paris TAM in French 9 Oct 80 pp 20-21

[Article by L. V. Patenotre]

[Text] Creil, an air base in the north Paris basin, presently supports the 10th Fighter Wing, equipped with Mirage IIICs, which is one of the links of the air defense set up in north France. Furthermore, Creil still possesses the FAS (Strategic Air Forces) label, although, since 1976, it has been nothing more than a deployment base which Mirage IVs only visit several days a month. Creil, seen from another angle, is a platform on which some 1,600 men live, who, each in their own way, participate in readying the planes, carrying out often obscure tasks which seldom have aeronautical 'nobility' but which are enhanced by being indispensable. We have not wished to make any distinction whatever between "flyers" and "the grounded" in describing the inner workings of this important unit.

A runway, a control tower, hangars, a slew of low buildings, all situated on a plateau, at the mercy of the wind's every whim, the Creil base resembles all the airbases of France and perhaps of the world.

Operational Resources

It is first of all an aeronautical platform which must operate day and night, in all weather, in maximum safety. Several agencies have a hand in conferring this character on it. They are grouped under the heading "Operational Resources." In the first place, the control tower whose silhouette is, to be sure, the trademark of an air base and the approach room. If the former works "in full view," the latter, for its part, in almost total darkness, operates basically from radar. The personnel of both have the mission to coordinate the movements of planes on the ground and in the air in the zone assigned the base. There are over 20,000 of them a year of which only one half are military. They also make sure that the air traffic safety rules are indeed respected, whether civilian or military makes no difference: the Mirage IIIs, the National Geographic Institute planes which are parked on the other side of the runway and all other planes which might, for one reason or another, be led to use the field have, seen from above, the same status (each one has a right to the same safety and the same service).

Besides the Local Airfield Supervision, for that is how the above-mentioned services are designated, the basic transmission department assures the operation of all air navigation aids (radar, beacons, etc) and the operation of all the base's liaison resources (telephone, teletype, radio, etc). Lastly, the meteorological department completes the whole.

Security Protection Resources

In the air force, security, of whatever nature, is the object of attentive care. The security protection resources look after it. They include firstly the protection squadron whose air commandos, stationed at base approaches and always ready to intervene, are vigilant to prevent any intrusion of the military territory. The protection command post centralizes information and coordinates action to be taken. Everything is planned for, even an immediate reaction to any risk of contamination of fissionable materials.

Technical Resources

All equipment, from the noblest to the commonest, requires continuous upkeep, which itself is dependent on spare parts. The "Technical Resources" look after this. The Everyday Equipment Upkeep and Repair Group (Germac) attends to everything which is not precisely aeronautic nor electronic. That is why they have an auto repair shop where 400 vehicles (of which 100 belonging to the Bourget base) as diversified as the reliable Renault 4 or the runway snow remover are kept in working order. Germac is, in addition, in charge of runway upkeep, upkeep of the backup barrier and ground lighting, lastly it assures the operation of the electric power station.

Its counterpart for complex equipment is called Germas (Specialized Air Equipment Upkeep and Repair Group). Attached to the 10th Wing, its domain consists of a single hangar in which it assures the upkeep of planes and their specific equipment. A large availability ratio is only to be obtained through periodic inspections, each of which restores a certain potential, generally expressed in flight hours. Germas' activity falls between that of the user unit (in charge of simple maintenance operations) and major upkeep of the plane which remains within the purview of the manufacturing agency. This constitutes an extremely vast area of activities when the extremely strict exactness which surrounds the security in readying a plane is taken into account. A complementary agency to Germas, and neighbor to it, the Technical Supply Squadron (ERT) furnishes spare parts to all the agencies of the base. It stocks in its pigeon holes 25,000 different articles of which more than half are subject to automatic distribution governed by a central computer located at Chateaudun. There has been an attempt to reduce the number of duplicates, which are always very expensive, by agreeing to stock in each base only incomplete batches. When a unit needs a part, it is taken from the warehouse where it is stored and dispatched by parcel delivery to its recipient. This rationalization effort makes possible very great savings, which are indispensable at a time when the equipment being used is constantly increasing in complexity, causing the number of spare parts to sky rocket.

General Resources

The base at Creil, a concentration of nearly 2,000 people, requires in its working a considerable number of performances as varied as the daily problems which crop up:

transport of personnel, garbage collection, building upkeep and, periodically, welcome and initial training of recently inducted recruits.

The General Resources provide all of those functions it would be tedious to enumerate in detail but which several figures can illustrate: the garage daily operates eight bus lines to which must be added exceptional departures, totalling 1,800,000 kilometers a year; every other month 300 young draftees show up for whom a military training center is organized. What is one to say about the service infrastructure in charge of upkeep? There are always little chores to be done for 'clients,' each one more detailed than the other! The General Resources in addition look after welcoming new arrivals, organizing school visits, regulating year-in year-out tours, not to mention the armory. In a word, nothing can be done on base without the General Resources being involved.

Administrative Department

Under the Air Commissary's direction, the Administrative Department attends to the administrative and financial management of the base's personnel and nontechnical equipment. An army of secretaries, accountants and cooks, by dint of incessant work worthy of an ant, assures everyone a meal served at lunch time, a pay check each month, an up-to-date military situation, a detailed breakdown of allowances of all sorts, payment of mission expenditures, good daily living conditions (supply and management of furniture, lodging, clothing).

Medical Service

Two thousand men to be looked after healthwise, indeed to be cared for and vaccinated according to rule." Another task perhaps less well known to the general public is continuous supervision of the state of health of flying personnel.

And lastly. A User: the 10th Wing

It has been stationed there since 1954, but its fate is not permanently linked to that of the base: the most that can be said is that 'sentimental' ties exist between the two.

Two two 01/010 "Valois" and 02/010 "Seine" Squadrons, each equipped with Mirage IIICs, train their pilots for wartime missions and carry out air surveillance within the air defense framework (cf. box). All total, the 10th Wing numbers around 500 people including about 40 pilots. In direct contact with the planes, they assure readying for use and current upkeep as well as follow up maintenance. It periodically happens that a squadron moves, either for deployment or a firing campaign. Pilots convoy their planes while mechanics with their tool and spare parts chests follow in Transall. At their destination, they find another terrain with its runway, its hangars, its tower and controllers, its firemen available. For the 10th Wing, the base at Creil is only an indispensable, not irreplaceable, instrument.

The complexity of ground structures has kept pace with that of the planes: the time is far off when a meadow and several engineering corps mechanics in greasy overalls sufficed to place in service some of the 'flying crates' of yesteryear. In today's air force, it is a whopping majority of the personnel, on the bases or

belonging to the wings, who participate and make possible the accomplishment of a mission carried out by a very small number: the "operation" is very onerous but could it be done any other way?

Missions of the 10th Wing

In peacetime:

- maintenance of resources on alert within the framework of
 - (i) air security: defense missions and 'air surveillance.'
 - (ii) air safety missions of assistance to aircraft in difficulty.
- training of pilots for wartime missions.

In wartime:

- in the first place, to protect the Strategic Nuclear Forces resources (bases, installations, aircraft, in-flight re-fueling axes, etc);
- assure the protection of the nation's territory (missions of general or specific coverage of air space);
- take part in the operational defense of the territory (attack on the ground and ground troop support missions) or in the intervention force.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 20. Munitions supply to planes
The tower's approach room: it is capable of supplementing the control center of Roissy-Charles De Gaulle.
2. p 21. What would a plane be without its 'nursing bottles?...or a pilot who installs himself?

Germac means vehicle upkeep...but also that of the backup barrier.

9330

CSO: 3.00

AIR FORCE'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WORRIES OFFICIALS

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Jacques Lenard: "Insufficient Training, Delays in Deliveries, Equipment Without Spare Parts--The Budget Commission Members in the Assembly Are Worried About the Air Force's Operational Capability"; passages enclosed in slant-lines printed in italics]

[Text] /The defense commission of the National Assembly last week expressed serious fears about the present and future operational capability of the French air force. The commission bases its doubts on an examination of delays discovered in equipping the air force--with regard to the military programming law covering a 6 year period and determined in 1977--and on the financing break that, according to the commission members in the Assembly, marks the air force's budget draft for 1981./

[Speaking before the commission members and expressing the opinion that "the air force had fallen below the crucial threshold,"/ the new chief of staff of the armed forces, General Claude Vabre-neesed, admitted that training for the air force was presently the "big problem" and that it will be necessary, at all costs, to authorize a substantial effort in air maneuvers in the years ahead./

[From 11 commission members, Louis Armand, UDF (French Democratic Union) deputy from Martinique, is correct, three quite serious facts show the fears that one can have about the air force's operational capability.

At the present time, the orders for equipment written into the budget draft for 1981 are based on planes without their spare parts. Moreover, in the face of delays in building and installing under the new Mirage-2000 combat plane (LE MONDE "Chronique", the types of planes of this type, for air defense, will be equipped with the present radar of the Mirage F-1 fighter, while waiting for better performing equipment, since the builders are probably 2 years behind in the program for a new radar system suitable for the Mirage-2000. Finally, the air force is building command aircraft to protect its combat forces on their heads, but these aircraft do not have doors)

To the Limits of What is Tolerable

The French air force, if we exclude nuclear power and transport aircraft, chiefly maintains 12 combat squadrons distributed in the following way: 22 for the tactical air force (of which five have nuclear capability) and 10 for Air Defense.

Regarding the principles initially determined by the government, which intended to aid equipment expenditures to the detriment of operating expenditures, there is a real reversal of this trend that we are observing in the air force. Payment credits for equipment are marking time, and program authorizations granted under the same heading are advancing less rapidly than inflation, which is a significant risk for the future. On the other hand, credits for operating must allow a strong rise related to the increase in the price of fuels.

In spite of a more than 80 percent growth in credits allotted to motor fuel, air maneuvers are kept at a very low level. The objective determined by the law for military programming in 1971-1982 is 505,000 flight hours every year. Bouvard observes that a total of 420,000 hours will be reached in 1983 only with the passage at the end of the year of a "financial extension" proposed in the budget draft. In 1981 air maneuvers retained by the government also remains at about 420,000 hours.

"Now," writes Bouvard, "this total of 420,000 yearly flight hours is the minimum level necessary to guarantee both training for the combat pilots and the necessary missions for air transport."

General Tachmeersch, however, admitted that if the air force pilots are keeping their 13 hours of training per month and per man, it is because the number of pilots has been reduced. As combat pilots, the number of pilots decreased, in fact, from 7.6 to 4.7. In due time all the pilots will be officers, or at least at the rank of candidate.

"It is impossible to go even lower in training, because we are at the limits of what is tolerable," remarked another commission member, Jean-Pierre Becker, RPR deputy for the Republic's Deputy from Le Havre. He observes, moreover, that even the helicopter pilots in the land army, with 12 hours of training flights per month, are in the same position as their airmen counterparts.

One's Back to the Wall

The situation is hardly more favorable regarding equipment. According to the commission's financial estimates, 3 billion francs are lacking in program authorizations for air force equipment.

We know that, taking into account the delay in building the Mirage-2000, it was necessary to order 24 additional Mirage-F 1's as a replacement, which had not been anticipated. But we have since learned that, for lack of a new radar system ready on time, the first Mirage-2000's will be delivered, if Bouvard is correct, with the radar system previously installed in the Mirage-F 1. In a general way, Bouvard believes that France is 2 years behind in radar technology and in creating electronic warfare equipment.

Bechter, for his part, makes no other comment while emphasizing, in conclusion, that "industrial tooling let itself get sloppy"/, by accepting technical delays in getting into working order radar systems, airplane motors and anti-aircraft defense.

For example, 2 years are still necessary for building, at the rate of about 50 concrete structures a year, the 100 hangars necessary to protect 350 jet fighter planes on their bases. At the present time, 250 shelters have been installed in 7 years of work, but they do not have doors.

In the same way, "the French foreign intervention forces do not have at their command the necessary means of transport,"/ asserted Bouvard, who emphasized the inadequacy of the range and of the tonnage shipped in the Transall planes, as well as the slowness of their speed. A Transall carries an 8-12 ton load at 450 km an hour over 3,000 km. An American C-5A Galaxy plane dispatches 80 tons at 900 km an hour over distances of 10,000 km.

"We do not have the funds to buy 15 Galaxy planes,"/ replied General Vanbremeersch, after having recalled that the civilian companies, when requisitioned, can lend some planes. For 1981, however, five new model Transalls--supply plane and supplyable in 11,000-12,000 km--are ordered, instead of eight planes wanted by the air force.

Some members of Parliament are coming to wonder if the capability of the French air force to defend the country should not be seriously re-examined and if, especially, a fleet of 430 combat planes, such as the government determined in 1978, is adequate today. "The air force has its back to the wall,"/ explains Bechter. "We have fewer planes than Iran or Israel, and not a single twin engine,"/ except for the Jaguar, which could compete with the powerful twin jets presently in service in 17 or 18 countries in the world.

AIR FORCE DC-8'S TO GET SNECMA-GE CPM56 JET ENGINES

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Nov 80 p 31

[Article: "SNECMA and General Electric CPM56 Jet Engines To Equip French Air Force DC-8 Aircraft"]

(Text) The French Air Force has decided to reengine its Douglas DC-8 long-range transports with the new CPM56. This engine, rated in the 10-ton thrust category, was designed jointly by France's National Aircraft Engine Design and Manufacturing Company (SNECMA) and General Electric, an American company. The purpose of this reengining program is to prolong the aircraft's useful operating life by equipping it with more powerful and more fuel-efficient jet engines. Several foreign commercial airlines have also selected the CPM56 to reengine part of their DC-8 fleets.

At the present, the French Air Force's order covers only four CPM56's to fit one DC-8-61 belonging to the Military Air Transport Command (OATM). The latter has four DC-8's in different versions, and even if the composition of this fleet were to be slightly modified, as is now contemplated, the CPM56 will probably be installed on the other DC-8's so as to standardize the aircraft inventory.

With the CPM56 in place of the Pratt and Whitney JT8D engine, the DC-8-61 should be able to reduce its fuel consumption by an estimated 25 percent and increase its operating range by some 15 percent. At the present time, the French Air Force DC-8's can carry 90 passengers an intercontinental distance of 10,000 kilometers at an average speed of 850 kilometers per hour.

The French Air Force is the first military customer for a jet engine that has already been chosen by seven commercial airlines, mainly in the United States. These airlines are United, Delta, Flying Tiger, Transamerica, Spanair, Capital, and Jet-Aviation. These civilian orders cover firm contracts for the reengining of a total of 69 DC-8's, plus options or letters of intent for another 19 aircraft belonging to these same airlines.

United Airlines alone has decided to reengine 30 DC-8 series 61 aircraft. United, the Western world's largest airline company, has already delivered the first of its DC-8's to McDonnell Douglas' Tulsa, Oklahoma plant where the reengining work will be done.

Continued on p 32

The French Air Force is also considering a plan to reengine its 11 C-130 tankers with the CPM56. This aircraft, which is a militarized version of the Boeing 707, has a

range of 4,800 kilometers with an offload capability of up to 40,000 tons of fuel. The French Air Force C-135's are now powered by four Pratt and Whitney J57 jet engines. Because they were completely overhauled last year in the engine manufacturer's facilities, these J57's now have a potential service life of several more years. This has prompted the French Air Force staff to request that they be reengined with a more modern, more powerful, and more fuel-efficient powerplant.

Especially since demands for C-135 support are steadily increasing: most modern combat aircraft, and lately most military transport aircraft, can be refueled in flight. In 1979, the 11 French C-135 tankers operated in support of Mirage-4 nuclear bombers (for 55 percent of their refueling time), Jaguar strike fighters (for the remaining 10 percent). The new version of the Transall military transport will also be refuelable in flight.

The C-135's are used so frequently and so heavily that the French Air Force would have appreciated having an additional six of these aircraft. But they are no longer in production, and the U.S. Air Force which has 640 such aircraft is not prepared to relinquish any of them.

In the contrary, the U. S. Air Force itself has also initiated a study on reengining all or part of its KC-135 fleet with the SNECMA-General Electric CFM56. One KC-135 is now being reengined and is scheduled to begin its CFM56 test flight program in 2 years. Financial considerations have Pentagon supporters and opponents of this project at loggerheads. One rival solution is said to be procurement of the new KC-10 tanker, a derivative of the McDonnell Douglas three-engined DC-10 commercial transport.

To date, France has made no decision on the possibility of a reengining of its C-135 tankers. For economic and industrial reasons, it will most likely have to take into account the U. S. Air Force's ultimate decision. A French C-135 powered by CFM56 engines could deliver 30 percent more fuel out to the same range as today, or deliver the same amount at 30 percent longer range. On the other hand, the KC-10 solution would be financially very burdensome. The National Assembly's finance committee has estimated it would cost 4 billion francs--the price of one strategic submarine with its nuclear missiles--to buy 11 KC-10's as replacements for France's present tankers.

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DEFENSE BUDGET RATIONS AIR FORCE'S USE OF FUEL

Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Serge Brosselin]

[Text] Before being submitted to a parliamentary vote on 23 October, will the draft Defense budget for 1981 undergo, during different committee readings, modifications which might partially call into question the presently existing equilibrium between operating and equipment of the forces expenditures?

Without being held to be inevitable this hypothesis in any event figures prominently in a 95 page report presented by Andre Rossi, the special rapporteur appointed by the Finance Committee of the National Assembly to examine ordinary expenditures, common services and gasoline of the future armed services budget.

The rapporteur in fact points out that "it is to be feared that in the new budgetary presentation Defense will no longer receive Allocation credits from common charges. Under these conditions--Andre Rossi adds--if the total amount of remunerations were to exceed the credits inscribed, it would be necessary to fall back on a redeployment of Defense credits which would doubtless be done at the expense of Title V (equipment expenditures)."

The EDF deputy from Aisne furthermore pointed out that if operating expenditures figuring in the draft budget as it was presented, on 2 October, by the former Defense Minister, are approximately conformable to the anticipations of the military programming law passed in 1978, it is in large part to the considerable increase of sums freed for the purchase of fuel that it is fitting to attribute the credit. There is reason to note, he states, that the average increase of operating expenditures in reality totals 13 percent compared with 1980.

Andre Rossi does not moreover rule out the fact that the enormous effort made this year on behalf of fuel (up 67 percent from last year) may not be sufficient to meet future price rises of petroleum products. If it appeared that the anticipated price rises of crude oil which served as basis to calculate credit attributions were exceeded, it would be necessary, under these conditions, to resort to supplementary credits so that the planned activity of the armed forces was not reduced. The rapporteur also added that prices of land vehicle and aviation fuel are very low; the prices of marine fuel have dropped considerably and that "this situation which is cause for alarm may be improved as quickly as possible."

Andre Rossi points out in this respect that air activity will be restricted in 1981 and that the goals set by the programming law can not be met. The minimum threshold of 150,000 flight hours achieved in 1978 (142,000 hours in 1977) will probably not be exceeded. The rapporteur notes, with good cause, that "this level seems to be located at the extreme lower limit of significant operation."

MILITARY SEEN LACKING SUFFICIENT FUEL SUPPLIES

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Oct 80 p 14

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Unless There is a Financial 'Extension' At the End of the Year. The Armed Forces Out of Gas"; passage enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] /Are they going to organize, again as in the past, on the bases of the French Air Force, those "meditation days"--a euphemism to indicate the "days without flight"--on which pilots and mechanics with their planes grounded, are really saving motor fuel, under the pretext of group meditation on their craft and their institution? This will happen if, in fact, the armed forces are out of gas, as they are threatened with being./

Motorists are not the only ones suffering an increase in petroleum prices. The military too is starting to seriously suffer from it, with the exception, certainly, of the police, who have been intentionally less disadvantaged by government arbitrage.

In 1980, the anticipated budget for fuel--7.358 billion francs for the purchase of different fuels to aid the three armed forces and the police--was revealed to be inadequate by about 1 billion francs for the intended purpose. Financial astuteness allowed, according to Andre Rossi, UDF (French Democratic Union) deputy from Alsace and member of the Finance Commission, twice releasing within the defense budget itself a total amount of 600 million francs that was added to the motor fuel credits already voted by Parliament.

An addition of 300 million francs will soon be called for at the time of the vote on the law for adjustment (finances, otherwise named the "budget draft," which is the year-end "extension").

For 1981 the budget draft shows an 86 percent increase in financial endowments for motor fuel, with total credits of 7.840 billion francs. Despite this large increase, illustrated by the fact that the budget for petroleum is solely for purchasing motor fuel has more than quadrupled between 1974 and 1981, the armed forces will have to continue saving. Austerity remains the priority.

The air force will have to be satisfied with 420,000 flight hours, instead of the 500,000 hours expected (LE MONDE 21 October). The land army will be authorized to

organize 47 training days for its large units, outside of their regular garrisons and with all their so-called organic equipment, instead of the 69 days anticipated. The land army will also have to abolish 350 vehicles from its fleet of liaison vehicles. As for the navy, every ship will have to, on an average, complete 86 days of training at sea in 1981, instead of the 100 days maintained initially. Finally, 92,000 flight hours will be assigned to the naval air fleet, instead of the 100,000 hours expected.

Causes for Concern

Andre Rousset rightly remarks in his report: "The deterioration of this situation will have repercussions on the level of training of our forces, but it also has an effect on their morale. The exercises or maneuvers abolished tend to create a feeling of boredom and uselessness."/

Both General Claude Vachonmaersch, army chief of staff, and Robert Foujade, RFR (Rassemblement for the Republic) deputy from the Cote d'Or and member of the defense commission in the national Assembly, are in agreement about emphasizing that the motor fuel problem is particularly critical in the air force. The operational capability of the air force could be impaired in due time, believes even the former minister, even if it has to be decided to draw on stocks.

Gradually, these war stocks have been restored, but in a very unequal way. "The stocks of automobile and airplane motor fuel are very much diminished," writes Rousset. "The stocks of navy fuel have substantially declined for several years in order to maintain the anticipated level of maneuvers."/

The situation, therefore, remains troubling. Jean-Marie Baillet, UDF (French Democratic Union) deputy from la Manche and member of the defense commission, recently asked that these motor fuel reserves be increased, because one must not wait for aid from the civilian sector. Rather the contrary would be true. In fact, France has available, in total, 108 days of stocks, so that the army has 90 days and there are 18 days left for the civilians.

Beyond this issue of the so-called strategic reserves, we must remember that the energy consumption of the French armed forces--heating fuel, electricity, automobile, marine and naval fuel--represented in 1979 about 1.33 percent of the national consumption, expressed in tons equivalent to petroleum (TEP).

NAVY'S OFFICER DISTRIBUTION, SOURCES OUTLINED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 80 pp 165-167

[Article by Bernard Dyle]

[Text] The Directorate of Military Personnel of the Navy (DPMM) administers 3,800 "service officers" out of a total of 4,300 officers authorized in budgetary manpower. The difference between these two numbers represents:

- 235 navy commissaries;
- 120 navy technical and administrative corps officers, including 7 female officers;
- 105 engineers of maritime studies and technical works;
- 25 officers of the maritime gendarmerie;
- 15 female navy officers.

The service officers are broken down into three corps:

- navy officers (ON), 66.6 percent
- specialized navy officers (OSM) 22.6 percent
- active reserve officers (ORSA) 10.8 percent.

Included in the corps of specialized navy officers are the officers of fleet crews (OE) and technician officers (OT) whose corps are being phased out.

For 1995 the navy's goal is to modify these percentages so as to reach respectively: 52 percent ON, 29 percent OSM, 19 percent ORSA. During the same period manpower should progressively reach 4,300.

The evolution in the breakdown by corps is being carried out in tandem with an evolution in recruiting.

Situation in 1978		1995 Goal	
100 ORSA	10.8 percent	800 ORSA	19 percent
75 rankers	1.8 percent	450 rankers OSM choice	11 percent
1,000 semi-direct navy	11.5 percent	1,400 semi-direct navy	33 percent
officers from the IMF,		officers from the IMF,	
ONM competitive exam,		ONM competitive exam,	
OT competitive exam, OT			
1,100 direct navy	11.8 percent	1,550 direct navy officers	37 percent
officers (ON + SIN)		ES	
Total	3,800	Total	4,200
ON: ON: Force Navale — OSM: Service Militaire de la Flotte			

Taking into account the fact that half of the ORSA are recruited internally, it is apparent that on the 1995 horizon 54 percent of navy officers will be promoted from crews, which is a very important evolution judging from the fact that prior to 1966 only 20 percent of officers were so promoted. We are therefore witnessing a radical modification of the physiognomy of navy officers corps and their method of recruitment. This modification is linked to an evolution in need, both quantitative and qualitative, to an improvement of the possibilities offered for internal recruitment, and to the concern to offer a smaller number of high level young people careers with rapid advancement which are attractive and entail great responsibility. To achieve this recruitment goal, the navy needs to call up each year:

--in the navy officer corps:

- (i) 60 Ecole Navale students of which 40 are enrolled in the "techniques and operations" program and 20 in the "scientific and technical" program,
- (ii) 30 students from the Ecole Militaire de la Flotte (EMF) (navy officers section) of which 15 are enrolled in the "service operations" program and 15 in the "technical departments" program,
- (iii) 2 to 3 officers recruited according to rank in certain specialized colleges:

--in the very specialized officer corps:

- (i) 30 students of the EMF from the "specialized officers section," broken down among 15 specializations,
- (ii) 25 specialized officers recruited as needed;

--in the active reserve naval officers corps:

- (i) from 5 to 600 "short term" ORSA of whom only a small number are permitted to re-enlist after their first engagement,
- (ii) 40 "long term" ORSA recruited among crews or among civilian candidates who pledge to sign a first engagement of 2 to 6 years over and beyond the legal duration,
- (iii) 10 specialized active reserve officers.

To this policy of diversified recruitment is joined a policy of training which takes into consideration the great breadth of professional activities in the navy, the necessity of taking into consideration the evolution of techniques and frames of mind and the care to be able to distinguish and select those who will be the most qualified to assure the carrying out of functions, involving great responsibility.

The policy for training service officers includes four steps:

- basic training adapted to each recruitment level and extended by a period of study (school or training);
- specialized training, the 1st degree of higher military instruction;
- advanced technical or general staff training, the 2d degree of higher military instruction. It is intended for officers who are to occupy positions of responsibility;
- study at the Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires of a small number of officers called upon to exercise functions of great responsibility.

As much by the variety and level of its recruitment as by progress in its training, the national navy is striving to satisfy its needs in service officers of different levels while at the same time making it possible for these officers to expand harmoniously according to their potential and their aspirations. A progressive but strict selection process makes it possible to steer towards the highest functions officers who at each stage of their career have demonstrated the required aptitude and competency.

N.B. Figures cited are taken from the White Book on Navy Personnel (December 1978).

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CSO: 3100

EIGHTH PLAN LEAVES UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION GOALS VAGUE

How To Obtain Goals

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 17 Oct-6 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Jean Boissonnat: "Thursday 2 October: The Plan Syndrome"]

[Text] When one reads the draft of the Eighth Plan (1981-1985) in the form in which the government just presented it to the Economic and Social Council one wonders what justifies this document's existence. Let us not be misunderstood: it is interesting, well-written, and full of meaningful information; all Frenchmen should be in a position to read it: they would end up having a better awareness of reality. But it is not a plan: not only because it does not set any overall goal in figures--neither a growth rate, nor an inflation rate, nor an unemployment rate, nor an internal financial equilibrium, nor an external balance--but also because the State itself does not make any commitment regarding the means of attaining the particular objectives mentioned in the priority action programs. Furthermore, the latter take up only about 30 pages at the end of a document which includes 270. One reads phrases in it as cursory as this one: "reduce by 20 percent between now and 1985 the annual consumption of alcohol per inhabitant." How? It is a mystery.

The only real reason which explains why hundreds of people--some of the best minds around--have devoted thousands of working hours to preparing this text is that France has plan syndrome.

This will from now on be a part of our political mythology. In the same way that the French Republic before the war was anticlerical, after the war it was planning-oriented. It is scared at the thought of not being that way anymore. Planning, a soft drug, has become necessary for all the political parties: people are planning-oriented on the left on principle, and on the right by habit. The staffs of industrial employers, of the unions and of the government bureaucracy would suffer from a "lack" if the Plan did not exist. To sit on one of the Plan's committees is to make the State, that divinity which the French still revere after having abandoned all others, officially recognize one's power or competence.

The Plan therefore performs specific functions in French society, even if it is just a string of fine words in which policy decided on elsewhere is cloaked. The Eighth Plan is Barreism--which is not really a short-term policy--explained in French. The Plan as an institution, is a symbol of something we do not admit to, the exchange between the ruling classes and the State. As a concept, it is

the last rampart of forecasting, beyond which one would have to admit that the future is inscrutable. And, for better or worse, it makes up for the social consensus and the grand design which are lacking. The accomplishment of these tasks of being a substitute is enough, when all is said and done, to give an institution legitimacy.

Unemployment Not Given Priority

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 17 Oct-6 Nov pp 189, 191

[Article by Jean Denizet: "The Dialectical Process of the Plan"]

[Text] With regard to the draft of the Eighth Plan, commentators have been struck by the fact that the document clearly bore the mark of the prime minister. Thus the issue of the respective roles of the government and of the Rue de Martignac committees in drafting the Plan presents itself again.

It must be remembered that the French Plan rests on two principles.

The first is that the draft Plan is a work product of the government. If there is one standard practice in French planning, from General de Gaulle to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and from Jean Monnet to Michel Albert, it is certainly that one. And that is fortunate: it is the strength of the French Plan. That is what gives it its effectiveness.

The second principle is the close association of organizations representing the economic realm, civil servants and experts, in working out the Plan.

These two principles are reconciled by an organized confrontation, during the entire preparatory period, of the viewpoints of the government and those of the commissions.

When the French Plan is described, emphasis is always placed, with good reason, on the commissions thought up by Jean Monnet. Their role as a meeting ground and a place for debates between unions, employers and civil servants is clearly pointed out. But insufficiently emphasized is that from this stage on the hosts and organizers of the meetings, the commissioner general's assistants, while they are seeing that all factions have their say, are also whenever necessary referring back to the government's viewpoint. Most of all, no one talks enough about another fundamental meeting, the one which takes place between the end of the commission meetings and the filing of a bill, a meeting which brings together on the one hand the commissioner general and his close associates and on the other hand the prime minister's immediate advisors. This crucial discussion has taken place for all the plans since 1944. The commissioner general presents his synthesis of the commission's work; he does the interpreting of the significant opinions that they came up with. It is from that discussion that the bill emerges. Thus the preparation of a French Plan is from beginning to end a dialectical exercise between the commissions and the government mediated by the commissioner general.

It would be shocking of course if the prime minister systematically cancelled out what the commissions contributed. The Plan would not have any meaning anymore and would not have any standing. It is already acquainted with dangers of this kind. Is this the situation in 1980?

In general the main reproach levelled at the government draft is of not having followed along with the commissions on the priority given to employment in the Plan's strategy.

For many of the participants in the commissions there is a nostalgic feeling for the evening last spring when the 27 scenarios for employment were presented to the Development Commission. The remarkable work of the Insee [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] and the general commissioner's office had been received with enthusiasm (there had been applause, a rare thing in a government meeting) particularly by the social partners. For the space of an evening it was possible to believe in un hoped-for convergence. Perhaps the government was wrong in not exploiting this success. In any case, even if the text of the Eighth Plan draft was not able to make that powerful moment known, its report of the scenarios is nearly identical to the report of the Development Commission.

It is with regard to how long people work, as a remedy to unemployment, that the government seems to have hardened its position. But that has been more in oral statements made to the press than in the official document which leaves many doors open.

On several other points the Plan's operating procedure worked effectively: there were changes in the points of view of both parties.

Let us take a few examples. The first is that of investment. The prime minister's policy up to now had shown little concern about aiding private investment. The importance of developments on investment and employment in the Eighth Plan draft, and the fact that the prime minister had stressed that the system of assistance recently decided on would remain in place for the Plan period, all of that is the result of the commission's work and particularly of the famous spring scenarios regarding employment and external constraint. Likewise, the president of the republic's decision making research a priority, the top priority, agrees with the relevant commission's work transferred into the draft.

Certain proposals of the commissions went directly into government texts. In this way the steps taken on 27 March on energy savings were borrowed almost unchanged from the Energy Commission's work.

It was the Agriculture Commission, supposedly corporatist-oriented, which was asked first about the development of the common agricultural policy, and about the need, while remaining faithful to its principles, to change it, particularly by creating new regulatory mechanisms. The government had never opened this up for discussion; it took up these ideas again for the first time in the Eighth Plan draft.

But ideas have also gone in the other direction. Or at least ideas dear to the government have been the subject of tacit agreement. No one, or almost no one, denied that advances in productivity, overall and in the medium term, are favorable to employment. This is one of the lessons of the Eighth Plan: if the commissions are representative of the French population, there is broad consensus at the present time on the image of and the plan for a "productivity-oriented" France.

BRIEFS

MINOR GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE--There was a minor government reshuffle today in Paris; Norbert Segard is appointed minister-delegate to the prime minister and is replaced as secretary of state for posts and telecommunications by the Yvelines Rally for the Republic deputy Pierre Ribes, until now report-writer for the posts and telecommunications budget in the assembly. Norbert Segard has been suffering from cancer for many months, and through this promotion the president of the Republic undoubtedly wants to pay tribute to him while releasing him from some of his functions. [Summary; [LD051836 Paris Domestic Service in French 1800 GMT 5 Nov 80]

RIGHTS DELEGATION IN ISRAEL--A delegation of the French Committee for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights arrived in Israel on Saturday for a 1-week visit to the occupied territories. The delegation is composed of Rene Andrieu, PCF Central Committee member and assistant editor of L'HUMANITE, and Alain Gresch, assistant of the Central Committee's foreign policy section. [Text] [Unattributed report: "A Delegation of the French Committee for the Defense of Liberties and Human Rights..."] [LD190959 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 10 Nov 80 p 7]

CSD: 3100

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS TO CONTINUE

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 8 Nov 80 p 9

[Text] Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mr. Lazarus Eframogiou, who Thursday attended a meeting of the Committee for Voluntary Restraints on Imports, has made no statement on the time when the import restrictions in question will be lifted.

Reliable sources believe the import restrictions will not be lifted until the end of the year when as of 1 January 1981, Greece will have to abide by EEC trading regulations as a full member of the Common Market. While the "voluntary" import restrictions have caused concern among Greece's Western trading partners and especially to Italy and Britain, whose exports have been hit hardest, the Greek government Thursday reported an improvement in the balance of current account which was due in no small measure to the restrictions in question.

For the second month in a row the balance of current accounts in September left a surplus of \$38 million. This development is due to both a 1.7 percent fall in the cost of imports and significant increases in receipts from exports of goods (38.2 percent) and services (18.2 percent). The high rate of increase in receipts from the export of goods was due in part to reduced receipts during the corresponding month of 1979. The net flow of private capital to Greece was restricted because of the reduction in the balance of foreign commercial credits.

The deficit in current accounts for the period January-September stood at \$1,430 million, thus remaining at the same level.

The improvement noted is due for the most part to the continuing slow-down in expenditures on imports. This appears greater if oil costs are discounted. The balance of current accounts without oil gave a surplus of \$620 million for the period January-September, compared to a deficit of \$162 million during the corresponding period of 1979. This means that the stagnation noted in expenditures for imports other than oil, combined with the 14 percent increases in revenue from goods (not taking into account oil) and services paid for the total of the additional cost in foreign currency of crude oil price hikes during 1980.

Tendencies noted in foreign transactions during the third three-month period of 1980, combined with the continuing increase in stocks during the month of October as well, lead to the conclusion that the current accounts deficit for 1980 may be kept below \$2,000 million.

Imports other than oil during the nine month period amounted to \$5,794 million, compared to \$5,822 million in the corresponding period of 1979. Exports amounted to \$2,921 million, compared to \$2,551 million. Oil imports, after discounting re-export of oil products, cost \$2,050 million in the first nine months in this year, compared to \$1,266 million in the corresponding period of last year.

In total, imports recorded an increase of 9.1 percent while exports went up by 10.1 percent. Invisible receipts increased by 13.2 percent and invisible payments by 15.8 percent. The deficit in the balance of trade was \$4,923 million and in the balance of current accounts stood at \$1,430 million.

CSO: 4920

EFFECTIVE OPEN PRISON SYSTEM REPORTED

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 9-10 Nov 80 p 11

[Text] It's not a new idea but it is certainly an effective one. Rather than keeping all prisoners in cells, the state chooses those whom it believes are willing to reform and lead a normal, law-abiding life after serving their sentences and allows them to work on open, rural prisons where they are almost free, are not cooped up in cells, are treated with more respect by unarmed guards and share duties such as looking after goats, chickens and cows and cultivating crops.

For those lucky enough to be allowed to go to one of the rural prisons, they will no longer hear the rattle of keys after they have been locked in their cells at sunset. All prisoners are taken on trust that they will neither escape nor be offensive to staff or other prisoners. Part of the success of the rural open prison scheme in Greece is that nobody has yet escaped, although this would be very easy given that the prisoners are allowed almost complete freedom to come and go as they please within the perimeter of the prison farm stretching for hundreds of acres. If a prisoner wanted to escape, he would not have to worry about digging tunnels, climbing over barbed wire fences, or escaping from armed guards. All he would have to do is walk out.

Three farm prisons exist in Greece: the first is in Kassandra, the second in Tiryntha and the third of Agia on Crete. Prisoners who work on the farms are also let off half their sentences, something which makes these prisons even more attractive. The size of the farm prisons are as follows, Tiryntha: 1,385 stremmata; and Agia on Crete: 500 stremmata.

The prisoners live either in a house on their own or with fellow-prisoners. Furniture is basic--a bed, a chest of drawers, a table and a chair. On top of the chest of drawers some of the prisoners have books loaned from the prison library or from friends who visit them and a number of prisoners have TV sets brought to them from home. The farm prisons do have a TV set or two for those who do not have their own set, and most of the inmates do not go to bed until the last news bulletin at about midnight.

Prisoners also have a great say in what they eat. While prison regulations state that they must eat meat and fish at least four times a week, the Director of the prison consults inmates as to what they would like to eat before the week's shopping is done.

The prisoners at the prison farms came from all backgrounds and have committed a variety of crimes. Usually inmates from the villages are put to work grazing goats or taking care of cows, while prisoners from the city are given easier tasks such as taking care of chickens, etc.

One of the inmates killed a friend in a taverna brawl because he was playing his guitar better than he could. He received 20 years imprisonment. Today, the memory of this act has almost faded.

Another prisoner threw his fiancée out of a hotel window. She was studying horticulture at University and he was an up and coming lawyer at the time. After ten years, he is taking care of rabbits on the prison-farm. A prisoner making coffee used to own his own cafe before being sentenced for killing his wife and her lover after catching them in the act of adultery.

At a separate table, former Ministry of Education official George Rammos, who leaked secret University entrance examinations to students, sits sipping a cup of coffee while next to him sits a Greek who tried to smuggle massive amounts of gold into the country from West Germany. All of them thanking the Lord that they are not in a cell, and counting the days until their release.

Translated and adapted from Tachydromos magazine.

CSO: 4920

PAPER COMMENTS ON PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH OPENING ALTHING

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 25 Oct 80 p 24

[Editorial: "Policy Speech without a Policy"]

[Text] The following are four main conclusions that an observant listener can draw from the prime minister's policy speech and the discussions about it:

After 9 months of chaotic fumbling and total inaction on the economy and inflation, the government is on the defensive in all areas. The difficult position in which the government found itself last Thursday night can only be called political bankruptcy.

The government party representatives' presentation did not indicate any coordinated policy to confront current developments in the country's economy, or anything that could put the "count-down" into effect or take its place.

In spite of the Progressive Party's cleverness in skirting the heart of the matter, their speech revealed restlessness, because no progress has been made in halting inflation as a new wave of skyrocketing prices lies ahead.

Geir Hallgrímsson, the leader of the Independence Party, as well as other spokesmen of the opposition, demonstrated that 20-25 percent wage increases were in store on 1 December in the form of a rise in basic wages, as well as equivalent price increases for fish products and agricultural goods. Since our basic sector, fish processing, is already running a deficit, a major "devaluation in one leap" can be expected with the resulting effects on price developments. Therefore, the question is how the government will respond after the end of the year. Perhaps a new "blitzkrieg" and new "February laws" can be expected.

Geir Hallgrímsson said the following: "The government set up an economic committee that submitted an opinion last August, but nothing followed in the wake of that. A committee of ministers discussed the proposals, but nothing happened. Economic measures were announced on 1 September. Nothing happened. The leader of the Progressive Party said at a conference in Vopnafjörður that the government would not last long if it were inactive. Inactivity continues to be its hallmark. Then, a great deal of work was to be done before 1 November and 1 December. Tomas Arnason, the minister in charge of prices, says that he will be horrified at the avalanche on 1 December, if nothing is done.

Now, these deadlines have been cancelled, like all the former ones. The count-down method of the Progressive Party, the election trump card, has been so embarrassing that the prime minister did not mention it during a half-hour speech, no more than he would a rope in the house of a hanged man."

Geir Hallgrímsson said furthermore that the upcoming currency change was of limited value unless radical economic measures were taken before the change, in such a way that the new krona gained lasting stability. This change of form per se carries limited weight. If everything remains unchanged, the new Icelandic krona will be worth less than other Scandinavian kronas by the end of the year and presumably half as much before too long. The prime minister said during a radio interview last night that economic measures in connection with the change in the exchange rate had been discussed within the government, but no conclusion had been reached. The conclusion that was supposed to be the premise for the formation of the government last February has not yet been reached. The prime ministers' words provide a profile of the government, its modus operandi and its achievements.

The leader of the Independence Party concluded by stressing that the first precondition to overcome inflation would be to cut down on government involvement and tax burdens, in order to improve the condition of the lowest wage earners, encourage initiative, intelligent planning and productivity in the national economy. A new offensive is required in the field of energy and energy-intensive industry to broaden the groundwork for higher productivity and pave the way for increased national income and improved living conditions. The failed policy of the People's Alliance must be withdrawn in this sphere.

Hallgrímsson said that opinion was divided in the Independence Party regarding the attitude towards the present government. But it is my hope and belief that all members of the Independence Party will unite, faithful to their ideas and policies, when the present government resigns. Therefore, it is necessary both for the nation and the party that this government resign as soon as possible.

8743
CSO:3111

CISL OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON FIAT AGREEMENT

Bari LA GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO in Italian 22 Oct 80 pp 1, 18

[Interview with Franco Marini, deputy secretary general of the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], by Benedetto Sorino, of LA GAZZETTA, in Bari; date not given: "This Is Our Mistake: a Strike to the Bitter End."]

[Text] Marini goes against the stream: the Fiat controversy has been a victory for the labor union. Lama and Trentin are wrong in flagellating themselves. But...

We were speaking with Franco Marini, deputy secretary general of the CISL concerning the order of the day: the Fiat agreement. His answers were somewhat surprising: odd, compared with the recent comments of almost all of the labor union leaders the day after the historic Rome signing.

For Martini, No 2 man in the CISL, the agreement is a labor union victory. It is a victory that has involved suffering, one that has been hard-earned, one that has witnessed a profound split within the labor union--but a victory, at any rate; because in the meantime the collective dismissals were revoked, and then because the Fiat had to agree to the criterion of mobility, from work place to work place.

"Which means," said Marini, "that after 2 years of wage supplements, those workers who have not found employment in the meantime will return to the Turin factory."

[Question] And yet both Lama and Trentin made a self-critique, in tones of defeat.

[Answer] Time will determine the validity of this self-critique. I am worried and annoyed at the daily ease with which some labor leaders allow themselves to make certain statements. It has now become fashionable to speak of the labor union crisis. But what is the use of saying: We made a mistake? What counts instead is to get involved in the present.

[Question] But one cannot forget that lately your difficulties with the rank and file have become heightened.

[Answer] Of course there are difficulties. We have serious orientation problems, even internal ones. But the problem is something else. How can one think that a labor union that exists within the folds of a society that is in a state of crisis is not frustrated by all of its contradictions?

[Question] But then what kind of contradiction is represented by the violent objection to Carniti, in front of the Mirafiori gates?

[Answer] Only the obtuse radicalism of extremist factions that have very little to do with the workers' movement. But, apart from these episodes of pure hooliganism, it is necessary to remember that, above all during the most fervent days of the conflict, certain radical positions that were voiced by minority groups drove the movement toward forms of an exasperated conflict. As if it were possible to exorcise the automobile crisis with strikes to the bitter end, that is, by always--and only--saying no. All of this weighed negatively on the outcome of the confrontation.

[Question] But how in the world did the hard line prevail?

[Answer] The strike to the bitter end started by being guided by the spontaneity of small groups. That perhaps was an error on the part of the labor union. When we decided on a general strike we should have asked that it not be a strike to the bitter end, because it is a break, as far as the mass of workers is concerned. One cannot think of keeping people out of the factory for a month without obtaining a general consensus. And there is no doubt that, with respect to this decision, the minorities prevailed in a consideration that was also shared by the labor union.

[Question] Could you not have avoided being unseated by these minorities?

[Answer] This is precisely the point where we fell down and the cause of the trouble. The agreement was good; it was a labor union victory. But the manner in which the compromise with the Fiat was developed, with such strong internal splits, now creates serious problems for internal democracy within the labor union. That is, labor union action cannot be reduced to the action of small, greatly politicized, minorities that see every conflict as an occasion for a revolutionary split. Labor union action makes sense only if it has the consensus of broad masses of workers. We must review the forms of internal democracy. We cannot allow small minorities to prevail over general orientations.

[Question] What did those 40,000 represent who went to the public square in Turin to ask for work? How much of an influence did they have on the signing of the agreement?

[Answer] They were the proof of a previous dissatisfaction. It cannot be said that they were maneuvered by the Fiat. This mass aggregation was the refusal of a very big part of the workers with respect to forms of labor union extremism. That demonstration was influential in preventing other splits from occurring within the labor union. Now other more general problems are emerging, including the question of contracts--occupational problems to which it will be necessary to give more time and space than in the past.

[Question] How much will this agreement cost the South, in terms of dismissals and wage supplements?

[Answer] I hope that it will not cost the South anything if this agreement is the premise of the recovery of an industrial group of such importance to the life of the country.

8255

CSO: 3104

BRIEFS

PAJETTA MEETING WITH MINIC--Rome--PCI directorate member Comrade Gian Carlo Pajetta yesterday received Comrade Milos Minic, president of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council Foreign Affairs Commission [as published] and chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] presidium, who was invited to Rome for the celebration of the Osimo Treaty. The meeting was also attended by deputy director of the LCY international relations department Comrade Borislav Milosevic, PCI central committee member and foreign section chief Comrade Antonio Rubbi and PCI Central Control Commission member and foreign section deputy chief Comrade Rodolfo Mechini. During the cordial conversation there was a broad exchange of opinions on the principal aspects of the international situation and the respective activities of the LCY and PCI in the struggle for peace, detente and international cooperation. The two sides also confirmed the desire to further develop the relations of cooperation between the LCY and PCI and to facilitate the development of relations of friendship and cooperation between the Yugoslav and Italian peoples. [Text] ["S.G." report: "Cordial Conversation Between Pajetta and Minic"] [LD191151 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 11 Nov 80 p 1']

CSO: 3104

BRIEFS

TAIWAN SUBMARINE SALE REVIEW--The Hague, 22 Nov (AFP)--The Dutch Government has postponed a decision on the sale of two submarines for Taiwan, Prime Minister Andreas Van Agt said here. The cabinet was due to discuss the proposed \$500-million contract yesterday. China's ambassador here has warned that any sale to Taiwan would be interpreted in Peking as a threat to the friendship between China and the Netherlands. Foreign Minister Chris Van der Klaauw is the only minister to have spoken out against the contract, sources said, but the government has come under heavy pressure from politicians, including the opposition Socialist Party, to allow the contract to the Dutch shipyards, which are hard hit by a lack of orders. [Text] [NC220801 Paris AFP in English 0715 GMT 22 Nov 80]

CSO: 3120

POLL SHOWS LABOR PARTY SUPPORTERS BELIEVE NORDLI WEAKER

Oslø AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] The fall turnover left the Nordli government weakened. Internal conflict in the Labor Party caused some cabinet members to leave the group. These are the clear conclusions of an opinion poll conducted for AFTENPOSTEN by the Norwegian Opinion Institute. Most of the government party's own voters believe that the shifts resulted in leaving Odvar Nordli with a weaker government than he had before and an even larger majority in the Labor Party regarded the internal party conflict as one of the reasons why three cabinet members wanted to leave the government.

Those interviewed, around 1000 people, were very aware of which cabinet members had resigned but were less familiar with the new names in the government according to the Opinion Institute's poll which was made in October.

"Do you think the government has become stronger or weaker as a result of the recent changes?" the Norwegian Opinion Institute asked. It has become weaker was the answer given by 57 percent. Only 17 percent said it had become stronger. The same as before, said 4 percent while 21 percent had no opinion.

Women interviewed were less sure than men that the restructured government has been weakened. Some of the responses looked like this:

	Stronger	Weaker	Same	Don't know	Total %	Base
Total	17	57	4	21	100	998
Men	18	62	5	15	100	496
Women	17	53	4	27	100	502
Labor Party	25	52	3	20	100	295
Conservative Party	14	71	3	12	100	260
Christian People's Party	8	61	6	25	100	82
Socialist Left Party	21	51	8	20	100	61
Liberal Party	14	55	1	30	100	61
Center Party	10	67	16	7	100	54
Others	20	72	--	8	100	38

Next the Opinion Institute asked: "Do you think internal conflict in the Labor Party contributed to the desire of some cabinet members to leave the government?"

Yes, replied 66 percent of all respondents, 65 percent of the men and 67 percent of the women, 61 percent of respondents under 30, 71 percent in the 30 to 59-year-old category, 65 percent of those over 60, 64 percent of those from Oslo/Akershus, 74 percent of those living in the rest of East Norway, 60 percent of those from South and West Norway, 67 percent of those from Trondelag and North Norway. When divided up by political affiliations the positive responses were equally clear: 57 percent from the Labor Party, 80 percent from the Conservative Party, 76 percent from the Christian People's Party, 66 percent from the Socialist Left Party, 65 percent from the Liberal Party, 72 percent from the Center Party and 86 percent from other parties.

Asked if the party conflict had contributed to the resignation of some cabinet ministers 20 percent replied no while 14 percent didn't know. Among men 26 percent said no (9 percent didn't know), women 15 percent (18 percent), under 30, 21 percent (18), 30-59 years old, 20 percent (9), over 60, 18 percent (17), from Oslo/Akershus 24 percent (12), elsewhere in East Norway 19 percent (7), South and West Norway 19 percent (20), Trondelag and North Norway 18 percent (15), Labor 29 percent (14), Conservative 12 percent (7), Christian People's Party 15 percent (9), Socialist Left 28 percent (5), Liberal 12 percent (23), Center 21 percent (7), other parties 9 percent said the conflict had no effect while 6 percent didn't know.

What do voters think of the government? The Norwegian Opinion Institute asked this: "Do you think the government's handling of developments is pretty good or pretty bad?" The answers went like this:

	Pretty good	Pretty bad	Medium	Don't know	Total %	Base
Total	33	49	5	13	100	998
Labor Party	58	23	5	13	100	295
Conservative Party	18	73	5	5	100	260
Christian People's Party	21	63	7	9	100	82
Socialist Left Party	33	49	2	15	100	61
Liberal Party	30	52	4	13	100	61
Center Party	21	62	7	10	100	54
Others	22	69	3	6	100	38

Most of those interviewed gave the right names in response to the question: "Who are the cabinet members who just resigned?" with 82 percent answering Inger Louise Valle, 77 percent had Bjartmar Gjerde on the list, 66 percent Andreas Cappelen while 13 percent answered that they didn't know.

The opinion poll showed here that more men than women knew the names of the retired cabinet ministers. There were few differences when the answers were divided up along party lines with one marked exception: Center Party voters

were much more aware than other voters of Bjartmar Gjerde's resignation from the government. In general Center voters were clearly superior when it came to knowing the names of those who had left the government.

But then they were asked: "Which cabinet ministers have just joined the government?" In this area the knowledge was more limited:

	Harriet Andreassen	Oddvar Berrefjord	Arvid Johanson	Don't know
Total	44	42	41	40
Labor Party	41	43	41	39
Conservative Party	46	44	48	35
Christian People's Party	43	37	37	36
Socialist Left Party	48	44	46	38
Liberal Party	46	53	40	33
Center Party	54	50	49	34
Others	39	43	44	30

6578

C90: 3108

DEFENSE MINISTER SEES MATERIEL, CONSTRUCTION AS PRIORITIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Nov 80 p 44

[Text] The future prospects for our defense in the immediate future are not without problems even with a real growth of 3 percent in this year's budget. The main problem will be channeling enough money into investment and construction, Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg said in a speech to the Polytechnic Society on Wednesday.

The defense minister, who talked about "Norwegian economy and Norwegian defense," said that we have had problems freeing funds for investment after weapons aid ended because current activities in the armed forces take such a large share of the total budget.

"But even if we manage to increase the materiel share of the budget we will probably still experience a growing gap between resources and the need for phasing out and modernizing," Stoltenberg said.

"This is because expenses for the weapons systems replacing older models have risen substantially more than the national product and the budget. It could eventually become impossible to fill the need in a meaningful way due to the accelerating price increases of advanced equipment. The question is, what do we do then?" asked Stoltenberg who stressed that he was not predicting dramatic changes in the structure of the armed forces. He answered the question like this:

"One possibility is going in for a less technology-intensive defense. We might have to adjust to a larger number of combat units with a lower technological content and reserve high technology for the most central operative purposes. But things could get tight even so." Stoltenberg did not believe that rationalization could produce the lacking funds and thought we should be pleased if it could prevent a further increase in personnel and operating costs in terms of their share of the total budget.

Stoltenberg therefore suggested that another possible course would be to make drastic changes in service patterns, for example reducing the service time to 6 months and increasing the number of refresher training exercises. He referred to professional military views in that direction in official publications where it has been claimed that we could get much more out of our defense in this way.

Another possible solution would be to shut down activities, Stoltenberg said, referring to the Swedish perspective plan covering the period up to 1992, prepared by Commander-in-Chief General Ljung. The Swedish plan outlines three different cost levels with different consequences. The least extensive would lead to phasing out six regiments while the most extensive would call for the elimination of 25 regiments.

6578

CSO: 3108

WOMEN LABOR PARTY MEMBERS OF STORTING AGAINST STOCKPILING

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 5 Nov 80 p 7

[Article by Turid Veber and Kristin Moksnes]

[Text] "People think that after they have elected us we have some influence on decisions made in Storting. That is true to a very limited extent in the area of defense and security policy. That is serious enough in itself."

Storting representatives Kirsti Grondahl and Inger Lise Gjorv said this to ARBEIDERBLADET. Along with representatives Anne-Lise Bakken and Ingrid Eide they wrote a chapter in the debate book, "Nuclear Weapons and Insecurity Policy," Tidens Press, which is coming out today. The four Labor representatives in Storting have different ideas about defense policy. But in the name of democracy they are calling for a more extensive and balanced debate. Also in Storting where most of the representatives play a spectator role when it comes to security policy.

Although this was not a major topic the representatives wrote that Storting did not really debate the issue of stockpiling heavy American military materiel.

"When the government decides this or that after discussions with 'Storting's organs' this is jargon for the expanded Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee. The rest of us don't even know when the committee has held a meeting, what it talks about or what statements it makes. The minutes from the meeting are secret, the 25 representatives don't have an opportunity to discuss the matter with party comrades and as far as we know the committee has never had occasion to present issues to the rest of Storting. In security policy matters we have an A group and a B group in Storting," said Gjorv and Grondahl.

When security policy issues are debated in Storting they are actually decided in the Defense Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee where representatives with established views on defense and security policy are placed. When extensive secrecy limits the access of other representatives to information there is little debate and wellrounded positions on defense policy are eliminated.

"The so-called modernization resolution last year came up suddenly without a proper party discussion ahead of time. Now we have again experienced an

extremely unfortunate handling of a security policy issue. The government affirmed advance stockpiling with reference to clarifications in Storting. But the issue was never put to a ballot vote and it was never discussed in detail. And the voters don't know that," said Gjorv and Grondahl.

"The government has made its decision on this issue but it is not the last debate on defense policy issues. We must look for a change making it legitimate to discuss defense, security and disarmament. The debates on nuclear power last year and stockpiling this year came up suddenly. To avoid such blow-outs in the future we must have a continuous and competent debate in the Labor Party. In the short term the debate on stockpiling is a burden but in the long run we think it would benefit the party. If we had been members of a nonsocialist party it would have been hard for us to criticize established defense policy. The biggest contribution nonsocialists have made to the debate has been to cast doubts. Attempts are made to render critics harmless, to define them as 'emotional' and brand them as almost unpatriotic. Lack of debate is elevated to a political virtue."

Grondahl and Gjorv believe this will have a backlash effect on the nonsocialist parties.

"There is a fundamental fear of arms race insanity among the people. The Labor Party has opened the way for a wellrounded debate. Therefore the Labor Party will be the most interesting party in this area in the future."

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CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

SVALBARD BUDGET ADVANCES--In its report to the government the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee supported the proposed Svalbard budget for next year. Thus the committee supported the purchase of a two-motor helicopter by the Svalbard administrator and connecting Svalbard with the national and international direct-dialing network next year. The budget also allows for new office and post office buildings in Longyear City. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Nov 80 p 2] 6578

CSO: 3108

PAPER COMMENTS ON PALME'S NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The movement has spoken. Yesterday, the Social Democratic members of parliament, with the support of the communists, voted for a declaration of no-confidence against the Falldin government. With that, the strong demands from the grass roots to stress their opposition were satisfied.

But party leader Olof Palme did not speak. From the Social Democrats' point of view, the no-confidence motion was a demonstration not only of their opposition to the government, but also of their powerlessness against a parliamentary majority that sticks together. By not making a statement explaining their voting position--unlike the VPK (Left Party Communists)--the Social Democrats attempted to tone down the significance of the vote.

Social Democrats in parliament apparently want to see the no-confidence motion as a one-time phenomenon, something that has been used to establish, once and for all, their position--and the lines of demarcation between the political blocks. They do not want to be forced time and again to ask for no-confidence votes and lose. Now the movement knows how things are, we hope.

The next time a major conflict arises, however, the Social Democrats cannot avoid being asked by others why they do not wish to demand a vote of no-confidence. It could be rather difficult to explain, and there are no guarantees for how the grass roots will react.

Even though the vote itself yesterday was undramatic, it was significant, nonetheless. It emphasized that block politics is now well established. To be sure, Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin stressed in a statement that the vote should not lead to intensified antagonism, but this is an unrealistic dream. As Olof Palme stressed after the defeat, the Social Democrats will concentrate on the party congress next year and on an election victory in 1982.

And the three-party government? Thorbjorn Falldin preferred to interpret the results as a vote of confidence for the government. Indirectly, it was that, but the enthusiasm for the government and for 2 years of block politics ahead, in some parts of the Center and Liberal Parties, is nonexistent.

It is still most probable that the three parties will persevere together throughout the election period and hope that a tough and firm economic policy will receive reluctant, but sufficient, support in the 1982 election.

What could dissolve the government's unity from within would be a sharp increase in unemployment next year, followed by a new major conflict. In that case, hardly even the most faithful supporters of nonsocialist block politics in the two center parties could manage to hold out any longer.

Block politics is something that can be advantageous to the extreme parties. For this reason, it is no wonder that the Conservatives and the VPK are the parties that advocate solutions that draw a dividing line through the political center. If broad cooperation between the Center, Liberals, and Social Democrats should develop, the Conservatives and Communists would not have much of a say.

For the Social Democrats, the equation is not so simple. In the short term, they can surely win strong support from the electorate and possibly regain power in 1982 if, as now, they decide in favor of confrontation with the three nonsocialist parties, but in the long term it is not at all so obvious that this line is so advantageous.

The Social Democrats can hardly hope for a stable majority of their own. The steady groups forming a nucleus of loyal voters will diminish. Also, with the more or less dependable support of the VPK, the majority in parliament can become narrow--much too narrow for the strong government the Social Democrats want.

For this reason, it is no wonder that some Social Democrats are considering cooperating with the Liberal and/or Center Parties. In spite of everything, there are many common interests, but opposition within all three parties is great. Thus, if there is actually to be cooperation, it must be among all three parties. Now, however, this possibility has been pushed a good way into the eighties.

The two middle parties, the Center Party and the Liberals, are the ones who are hurt most by block politics. The opinion polls point downward. The possibility of the parties' working now with the left, now with the right--which is perfectly natural for any party with some type of social-liberal basis--disappears. There is the risk that the party profile becomes faded. The Center Party managed this for a time with its battle against nuclear power, but this question has lost its force in party politics.

The Conservatives are now much stronger in Falldin's second government than in his first. Of course, this is because there are more of them in the government and in parliament and because, in general, there is a turn to the right in the society. Another important cause, however, is that the Conservatives' pet questions are now in vogue, in particular the need for much greater economy on the part of the state and communes.

The center parties, however, are not without blame for their being relegated to the background. A striking example is the manner in which the government drew up its program for improving the national and state economy. Economy measures have dominated completely. The tight restraints needed for those who have it best had

not been developed and were not presented together with the economy measures, which would have been natural. Not until 3 weeks after the economy measures were first presented did budget minister Wirten come out with a program against tax cheating, which in itself was welcome. Too little, too late, as they say.

The center parties can probably drop any possible hopes they may still have of cooperating with the Social Democrats on the economy. The time for that is past. But for their own sake and for the sake of broad groups of the people, they should act together more. In this regard, T. Bjorn Falldin has a great responsibility not just to mediate among three parties, but also to pursue centrist policies.

9336

CSO: 3109

LAUSANNE YOUTH DEMONSTRATIONS AIMED AT VARIOUS TARGETS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 80 p 13

Autonomous Center Wanted

[Article by O.F.]

[Text] Lausanne, 19 Oct--Last Saturday Lausanne was once more the scene of youth demonstrations. The damp and cold weather did not deter some 200 to 300 young people from engaging in violent activities in accordance with their watchword "On va casser du flic," which is circulating among their ranks. One group broke open the door of a house near the old ETH building in the Avenue de Cour and occupied its rooms in order to set up an "autonomous center." The police, who had apparently been notified in time, took energetic action and cleared the house, using water hoses and tear gas. Later, the demonstrators gathered in front of city hall at the Place de la Palud and moved on to the railroad station and, in so doing, some rowdies made some parked cars the object of their rage. The police again took quick and energetic action. A total of approximately 100 young people were temporarily arrested, and this action presumably has cooled off their desire for any further confrontations with the police.

The more frequently such violent actions are repeated in Lausanne, to that much greater extent are the young people isolating themselves from the city's inhabitants, the majority of whom are reacting negatively and with increasing displeasure to this irrational, and even chaotic, "movement" which characteristically operates under the vague watchword "Lausanne bouge." It is typical that, in a VOIX OUVRIERE statement, the communists have also dissociated themselves from the cause of these young people. At the same time they also announced their dissociation from their former grand councilor, Mrs Menetrey, who had originally been publicly supportive of "Lausanne bouge." Presumably the rejection of the "casseurs" is even more vehement among the ranks of the workers with a communist and social-democratic orientation than it is in the sphere of the middle class, where some circles are at times intent on proving that they are "dans le vent."

Housing Shortage Attacked

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] (SDA) Youthful members and sympathizers of the "Housing Shortage Action Group Squad" in the course of an "informative demonstration" on Saturday carried

a tree through the city and then planted it in the Stadthof area. The Stadthof houses had been occupied by young people in July, but were later pulled down. With their action, carried out under the slogan "Life instead of Profits," the young squad members demonstrated against the housing shortage and against the conversion of living quarters to banks and offices. At the end, they reaffirmed their determination to defend the tree as a symbol of life against any kind of private and official interference.

Ritschard Comments on Riots

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] (SDA) During the past weekend, Federal Councillor Willi Ritschard commented on the problems of the young people and on the events of recent months. He said that, while he was not justifying anything that had happened as a result of the demonstrations, one must explore the causes of these happenings "openly and with the courage necessary to get at the truth."

On the subject of the questions concerning the Autonomous Youth Center (AJZ), Ritschard explained in the Saturday edition of BLICK that, in view of the problems connected with the space and living facilities of the young people in the cities, it is logical for the young people to have come upon the idea of demanding such a center. With reference to the closing down of the Autonomous Youth Center, Ritschard commented that one must realize that an autonomous youth center "is not a church, where one patiently listens to the minister and then sings a hymn and goes home." He said that one must also accept the fact that some absurdities will occur when such diverse types of people come together. Ritschard also showed understanding for the demonstrations, saying that "demonstrations in the streets have always been the weapon of those who felt powerless and suppressed." Ritschard also disputed the idea that the press, the radio, and television were to blame for the escalation and that these media had contributed to a heating up of the confrontation.

8272

CSO: 3103

'DUNYA' MAKES CALL FOR PARTICIPATION, DISCUSSION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 12 Nov 80 p 1

[Editorial by Orhan Birgit]

[Text] Turkey has a variety of problems. These problems continually grow worse. Our foreign economic relations, our domestic political dilemmas. These headline the problems that confront the present, highly devoted administration with the goal of overwhelming it.

The new administration, which has been in office only 2 months, certainly did not bring with it any of these numerous problems. Had not the country experienced severe problems years on end and had not this situation become a crisis, would our Armed Forces, whose primary duty is onus enough, have chosen to assume new and heavy burdens that are quite alien to them?

An urgent duty awaits those who desire that the Armed Forces, which were compelled to take control on 12 September to save Turkey from collapse, attain success and that the country return to a parliamentary system as soon as possible.

This duty is to assist the administration and make a contribution through fullsome and liberal discussion. Only in this way can we ensure the means of finding the true path.

What is the true path?

Like Ataturk said, the true path is grounded in objective science. The true path is that path found only after various hypotheses are submitted and discussed; it is not what some individual or institution says it is. For example, is it assured that Turkey's economy will breath freely because of the 25 January program? Is the country's only true path the "Ozal prescription"? Is the country's political future to be decided by an urgent Constituent Assembly? If so, should this body be composed of scientists and technocrats? Or should the intention be to invite politicians and let these individuals make their contribution?

If the true path is discerned only through discussion, why this hush among those of us who expect positions from them in the Turkey of tomorrow?

Why does it suffice to follow from the bleachers the faits accomplis with a dumb silence?

The 12 September regime is certainly not a dictatorial one. This administration had made it clear from the very first day that it is not a permanent one.

Therefore, is it not time and are we not naturally responsible for offering reasoned, sound, coherent, and unfettered contributions like, "Don't do it that way"; "The problem can't be solved this way" rather than a circumspect, "Let's wait, let them carry out whatever solutions they come up with"?

CSO: 4907

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